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THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
INTEREST-FREE LOANS FROM
CORPORATIONS TO SHAREHOLDERS AND
FROM EMPLOYERS TO EMPLOYEES
ROBERT I. KELLER*
INTRODUCTION
Between corporations and shareholders, as between employers and
employees, interest-free' loans are commonplace.' Economically, their ef-
fect is identical to that of a loan on which interest is charged, accompanied
by an increase in either dividend or compensation, in an amount equal to
the charged interest. 3 That is, the two-payment transaction is economically
indistinguishable from the interest-free loan. And yet, under present law,
the tax consequences are quite different.
This observation may be illustrated by an example.' Corporation X
makes an interest-free loan of $1,000 to its sole shareholder for twelve
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland; B.S., 1963 University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1966
Harvard University. I am grateful to my colleague, Anthony J. Waters, for his helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article.
' While this article speaks only of loans without interest, its reasoning applies equally to
loans which carry an interest rate lower than that which would have been imposed in an arm's
length transaction.
2 This is particularly true of interest-free loans from employers to employees. In 1974,
Business Week reported that "more and more companies now grant low or no-interest loans
to attract middle and upper-management executives." Business Week, Nov. 9, 1974, at 162. It
also has been reported that many professional athletes are demanding "interest-free loans
from their employers as part of their compensation package." Duhl & Fine, New Case Allowing
Interest Deduction Calls for Reappraisal of No-Interest Loans, 44 J. T Ax. 34. 34'(1976).
It is assumed throughout this article that the described interest-free loan creates a
bona fide obligation on the part of the shareholder or employee to repay the principal. If no
bona fide obligation exists, the entire amount of the loan principal could be treated as a div-
idend or compensation distribution. Livernois Trust v. Comm'r, 433 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir.
1970). See BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL. INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 9 7.05, at 7-26 (3d ed. 1971). While one test of a bona fide debt is a provision
for interest on the loan, e.g., Berthold v. Comm'r, 404 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1968), the fail-
ure to charge interest, standing alone, is not dispositive. See, e.g., J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C.
1083, 1087-90 (1961).
See, e.g., Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 1965 So. CAL. TAX IN.s .r. 643, 652-53.
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months. Assume that the prevailing market interest rate for such a loan is
eight percent. 8 The two-payment transaction which would yield the same
economic effect as the no-interest loan is this:
Payment 1 — Corporation pays shareholder an $80 cash div-
vidend.
Payment 2 — Shareholder pays corporation $80 cash as inter-
est on a $1,000 loan over a twelve month period at
eight percent.
The tax consequences of the two-payment transaction are as follows: the
corporation-lender would have $80 interest incomes from Payment 2 and
no offsetting deduction from the payment of the dividend (Payment 0; 7
the shareholder-borrower would have dividend income of $80' from Pay-
ment 1 8
 and an offsetting interest deduction in the same amount from
Payment 2. 9
 The interest-free loan, by contrast, yields a different tax con-
sequence under present law: the corporation making the loan realizes no
interest income" and the shareholder receiving it has neither dividend in-
come" nor a deductible interest payment." The law's current approach to
the interest-free loan may be labeled the "no income, no deduction" ap-
proach.
In this article, it is argued that the failure of our taxing system to
treat the interest-free loan in conformity with its analogous two-payment
For a discussion of the problems involved in determining the appropriate interest rate,
see text at notes 131-35 infra.
1.R.C. § 61(a)(4). The $80 income item will also increase corporate earnings and pro-
fits by $80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1960). See also B. B1'1-flit:II & J. EusTicE, supra note 3,
at 1 7.03, at 7-13-14.
However, corporate earnings and profits would be reduced by the $80 cash dividend
paid. I.R.C. § 312(a)(1).
Corporate distributions to shareholders out of current or accumulated earnings and
profits are taxable as ordinary income to the recipient. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7); 301(c)(I); 316(a).
I.R.C. § 116(a) excludes the first $100 of dividends received by an individual shareholder and
the first $200 on a joint return. Treas. Reg. § 1.116-1(b) (1960). A corporate distributee has
available an 85% dividends received deduction. I.R.C. § 243.
9
 This assumes that the taxpayer either itemizes his deductions or applies the principal
for a business purpose. 1.R.C. § 163 permits an itemized deduction for "all interest paid or ac-
crued within the taxable year on indebtedness." An interest deduction is proper whether the
debt arises from a personal or a business obligation. If, however, the interest is a business ex-
pense, or is attributable to property held for the production of rents or royalties, it is de-
ductible from gross income in arriving at adjusted gross income, see I.R.C. § 62(a); F.R. In-
gram v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1447, 1464-65 (1961), and so is available to taxpayers who
do not itemize. Interest on funds borrowed to purchase other investments is deductible only
from adjusted gross income. Id. There are, however, a number of limitations on a taxpayer's
right to claim an interest deduction. See text at notes 32-35 infra.
'° See, e.g., Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416, 447 (1960); Society Brand Clothes, 18
T.C. 304, 320-21 (1952). See text at notes 71-103 infra. Presumably, because the corporation
realizes no income, the interest-free loan neither increases nor decreases corporate earnings
and profits. This is because earnings and profits are computed by reference to income. See
Treas. Reg. I .312-6(b) (1960); B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, 1 7.03, at 7-13 - 7-14.
"J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961). See text at notes 13-23 infra.
"See Howell Turpentine Co., 6 T.C. 364, 393-94 (1946), rend on other grounds, 162 F.2d
316 (5th Cir. 1947); Rainbow Gasoline Corp., 31 B.T.A. 1050, 1059-60 (1935). See text at
notes 55-70 infra.
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transaction cannot be justified. Instead, the interest-free loan should be
treated identically with its two payment counterpart, by employing a "two-
payment transaction analysis." Under this analysis, the interest-free loan is
resolved into its hypothetical components. Thus the lender is deemed to
transfer to the borrower not only the principal of the loan but also an
amount sufficient to cover a reasonable interest charge. This interest
amount is later deemed repaid to the lender. Part I of this article examines
the interest-free loan from corporation to shareholder and discusses three
questions: first, whether the shareholder-borrower realizes dividend income
from the free use of the borrowed money; second, whether the
shareholder-borrower is entitled to an interest deduction; and third,
whether the corporation-lender realizes interest income. Part II of the arti-
cle applies the corresponding questions to the situation of the interest-free
loan from employer to employee and poses a further question: whether the
employer-lender is entitled to a business expense deduction for compensa-
tion paid.
Part III, concerning timing and valuation questions, discusses first,
the appropriate interest rate to be applied to the interest-free loan assum-
ing that income is realized; and second, the peculiar timing problems of
taxpayers reporting income and taking deductions arising from an
interest-free loan transaction. The different issues raised by demand loans
and loans with a fixed repayment date are separately considered in this sec-
tion.
Part IV considers the tax consequences of bargain sales of property by
an employer or corporation to an employee or shareholder in exchange for
the latter's non-interest bearing promissory note. The section examines the
overlap between section 483 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), a sec-
tion which permits the imputation of interest in certain transactions, and
the recommended analysis of taxing the interest-free loan as a two-payment
transaction.
Finally, Part V of this article examines the applicability of section 482
of the Code to interest-free loans from corporations to shareholders where
the corporate lender and the shareholding borrower are not commonly
controlled corporations.
I. THE INTEREST-FREE LOAN FROM
CORPORATION TO SHAREHOLDER
A. Does the Shareholder-Borrower Realize
Dividend Income?
The first question raised concerning the interest-free loan from cor-
poration to shareholder involves the income consequences to the sharehol-
der. At first glance, these consequences would appear obvious. The
shareholder should report dividend income equal to the economic benefit
derived from the interest-free loan' 3 —i.e., a sum equal to a reasonable in-
" This assumes that the corporation has suffiCient earnings and profits to support the
dividend. If the economic benefit exceeds corporate earnings and profits, the excess should
reduce the shareholder's basis in his stock to the extent thereof, I.R.C. § 301(c)(2), with any
additional amount being treated as gain from the sale or exchange of the shareholder's stock,
I.R.C. § 301(c)(3).
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terest rate on the loan. Under section 61 of the Code, gross income is de-
fined as "all income from whatever source derived" unless excluded by
other provisions of the Code. It is clear that items of gross income need not
be in the form of cash;" all economic benefits are taxed, whether such
benefits take the form of title to property, free services, or the rent-free
use of corporate owned property." Since the use of money seems no dif-
ferent from the use of tangible property," the economic benefits derived
from such use should be taxed. Yet, in the only case to decide the income
issue, the Tax Court, in J. Simpson Dean," held that a stockholder realizes
no income from his interest-free use of a corporation's money."
In Dean, a corporation had made interest-free loans in excess of two
million dollars to its controlling shareholders. Relying on the long series of
cases holding that the rent-free use of corporate property by a stockholder
or officer results in the realization of income," the Commissioner asserted
that the shareholders "realized income to the extent of the economic ben-
efit derived from the free use of borrowed funds from [the corporation]. ,20
" Treas. Reg. 1.61-1(a) (1960). See B. BITTKER & L. STONE. FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND
GIFT TAXATION 44 (4th ed. 1972). If the rule were otherwise, "Wax burdens would fall in an
irrational manner depending upon the fortuitous circumstance of the practicality of compen-
sation in kind." Id.
" Treas. Reg. I.61-1(a) (1960). See, e.g., Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449, 450 (1934)
(shareholder taxed on fair rental value of corporate-owned apartment which he occupied
rent-free). In Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), the Supreme Court stated that sec-
tion 61's predecessor was "broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or finan-
cial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which
it is effected." Id. at 181. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TAX RETURNS FOR 1969-1972, at 158-61 (Comm. Print.
1974) (free use of government transportation on personal business constitutes "income").
"See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL. REVENUE TAXATION, supra note 15,
at 171 n.6.
17
 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
' 8 1d. at 1090. In Saunders v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (D. Hawaii 1968),
reed on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971), the district court held, without discussion,
that an interest-free loan did not constitute compensation to an employee. Cf. Joseph
Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1974) (no constructive div-
idend to common shareholders on interest-free loans between related corporations).
The Tax Court has dodged opportunities to review its Dean decision. See Claude J.
Lisle, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627, 640 (1976); Arthur Genshaft, 64 T.C. 282, 291 (1976). But in
Lester Crown, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), a recent case in the related area of the gift tax conse-
quences of interest-free loans, the Tax Court appeared to reaffirm its no-income decision in
Dean. The Tax Court in Crown stated that, "tale courts have uniformly rejected every attempt
by the Internal Revenue Service to subject the making of non-interest bearing loans to income
or gift taxes." Id. at 1064. On the gift tax question before it, the Tax Court in Crown held that
an interest-free loan did not constitute the transfer of an interest in property, and was there-
fore not a taxable gift. Id. at 1062. Accord, Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73, 77 (N.D.
Tex. 1966). Contra, Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-I C.B. 408; Gertrude H. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204,
207 (1953). The Tax Court majority in Crown failed to refer to its seemingly contrary decision
in Blackburn. For a description of the Blackburn case see text at notes 153-56 infra. Crown is
noted infra at p.359.
E.g., Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66, 73-74 (1950) (rent-free use of a corporate au-
tomobile); Percy M. Chandler, 41 B.T.A. 165, 178 (1940), affd, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941)
(rent-free use of corporation's apartment and lodge); Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449, 451
(1934) (rent-free use of corporation's apartment). For a recent compilation of other similar
cases, See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, Supra note 15, at
158-160.
" 35 T.C. at 1087.
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Judge Raum, speaking for the majority of the Tax Court, however, held
that the interest-free loan resulted in no income to the stockholder-
borrower, noting that the cases involving rent-free use of corporate prop-
erty had only a "superficial resemblance" to the interest-free loan situa-
tion. The characteristic distinguishing the interest-free loan from the rent-
free transfer of property, according to Jude Raum, was the fact that, in
the interest-free loan situation, had the recipient of the interest-free loan
actually paid interest, that interest would have been fully deductible under
section 163. 21 For this reason, Judge Raum declared the line of cases in-
volving the rent-free transfer of corporate property to a stockholder or of-
ficer "not in point," saying of the rent-free cases:
In each of them a benefit was conferred upon the stockholder or
officer in circumstances such that had the stockholder or officer
undertaken to procure the same benefit by an expenditure of
money such expenditure would not have been deductible by him.
Here, on the other hand, had petitioners borrowed the funds in
question on interest-bearing notes, their payment of interest
would have been fully deductible by them under Section 163,
I.R.C. 1954. 22
Accordingly, since the inclusion in income of the benefit of the interest-free
loan would have been balanced by an equivalent deduction, Judge Raum
decided that the same result could be achieved more easily by recognizing
neither income nor a deduction."
The court's analysis in Dean is flawed in several respects. First, even
where an interest-free loan would, if treated identically with the equivalent
two-payment transaction, produce both income and an equivalent deduc-
tion, the inclusion in income nonetheless could give rise to important tax
repercussions. For example, the itemized deduction for medical expenses is
the amount by which medical expenses exceed three percent of adjusted
gross income. 24 If adjusted gross income is increased by the economic ben-
efit of an interest-free loan, the allowable medical deduction is reduced. 25
Moreover, in the case of an employee receiving an interest-free loan, use of
the two-payment transaction approach could yield tax liability lower than
that produced by the no-income, no-deduction approach. This would occur
in situations where the economic benefit from the interest-free loan—which
benefit constitutes "earned income" to the employee—is subject to tax at a
21 Id. at 1090.
22 id,
221d .
24 I.R.C.	 213(a)(1).
25 This result does not obtain, however, where the borrower's deduction for the con-
structive interest payment constitutes a business expense or is attributable to property held for
the production of rents or royalties. In such cases, the constructive interest deduction reduces
gross income. See note 9 supra. Because this reduction in gross income arising from the con-
structive interest payment exactly equals the increase in adjusted gross income attributable to
the economic benefit of the interest-free loan, the reduction and increase cancel one another.
As a result, adjusted gross income remains the same as it would have been had neither ad-
justment been made. So the "floor" of 3% of adjusted gross income is neither raised nor low-
ered, and the medical expense deduction (the amount above the floor) is identical to that pro-
vided by the no-income, no-deduction approach.
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marginal rate of no higher than 50%,26 while the equal interest deduction
offsets some income otherwise taxable at a 60% or 70% marginal bracket."
In these and in other situations," the no-income, no-deduction approach
fails to give effect to provisions of the tax code by excluding from gross in-
come or adjusted gross income the impact of the economic benefit attend-
ing an interest-free loan.
A second flaw in the majority's analysis in Dean can be found in its
failure to identify certain situations in which the two-payment analysis
would yield an interest deduction but would not produce an equivalent in-
clusion in income. For example, consider the case where an interest-free
loan is provided to a shareholder at a time when the corporate lender has
no current or accumulated earnings or profits. Applying Dean, the
shareholder-borrower would have neither income nor a deduction. In a
two-payment transaction, however, the borrower would have an interest
deduction but no dividend income. This is so because Code sections 301
and 316 provide that a distribution which is not out of earnings or profits
is not a taxable dividend." In this case, then, the two-payment analysis, by
providing a deduction which is not offset by an equivalent income inclu-
sion, produces a more favorable tax result for the shareholder-borrower
than does the no-income no-deduction method. 30
A third problem with the court's reasoning in Dean can be found in its
implicit, brokl assumption that the interest paid in a two-payment transac-
tion will always be deductible under section 163. 31 So broad an assumption
is not warranted. 32 For example, a person who does not itemize his de-
" I.R.C. § 1348 provides an alternative tax computation for earned income under
which earned income in taxable income brackets which would otherwise be greater than 50%
is subject to a flat 50% rate.
" For a full discussion of the mechanics of I.R.C. § 1348, see J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22 (2d ed. 1973).
"E.g., I.R.C. 6501(e) (extends the running of the normal three year statute of limita-
tions to six years where an omitted item, properly includible, exceeds 25% "of the amount of
gross income stated in the return"); I.R.C. § 6012 (the necessity of filing an income tax re-
turn); I.R.C. 6013(e)(1)(A) (relief of a spouse from joint tax liability); I.R.C. 151(e)(1)(A)
(the right to claim a dependent as an exemption); I.R.C. 170(b) (limitations on the charitable
contributions deduction). Judge Opper, in a concurring opinion in Dean, recognized that
although the amount required to be included in income under the two-step transaction
analysis normally will be offset by an equivalent deduction, "it would not necessarily follow
that there was no gross income." Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090-91. Nonetheless, he concurred in the
court's opinion on the ground that there was no deficiency since the interest income and in-
terest deduction probably would offset and cancel one another in this case. Id. at 1090.
29
 The borrower-shareholder, however, would be required to reduce his basis in the
stock by the amount of the economic benefit, I.R.C. § 301(0(2), with any amount greater than
basis being treated as gain from the sale or exchange of his stock. 1.R.C. § 30I(c)(3).
" Favorable treatment under the two-payment analysis also results where the dividend
income of an individual shareholder-borrower, excluding the constructive interest income, is
less than $100. Code section 116 excludes the first $100 of dividend income for individual
shareholders. In this case, that portion of the economic benefit of the interest-free loan which
is applied against the statutory $100 dividend exclusion would not be taxed, I.R.C. § 116, yet
the shareholder would still enjoy the full interest deduction. The same result, full deduction
without offsetting income, would accrue to corporate shareholders due to the dividends re-
ceived deduction of I.R.C. § 243, provided I.R.C. § 482, which authorizes the Commissioner
to allocate income among controlled taxpayers to reflect true income, does not apply.
" 35 T.C. at 1090.
" The court's overly broad generalization was criticized by the concurring and dissent-
ing judges. Id. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring); id. at 1091 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
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ductions33
 could not, of course, deduct the interest paid unless the bor-
rowed funds were used for his business purposes. 34 Similarly, even the per-
son taking itemized deductions would be entitled to this interest deduction
only if the indebtedness were not "incurred ... to purchase or carry obliga-
tions ... the interest on which is wholly exempt from ... taxes."35 In these
respects, then, Judge Raum's no-income, no-deduction approach could re-
sult in undertaxing the recipient of an interest-free loan when compared
with the treatment afforded the taxpayer in the economically equivalent
two-payment transaction where the taxpayer receives a dividend and pays
an equal amount of interest.
Another flaw in the court's analysis in Dean appears in the majority's
reliance on the deductibility of interest, contrasted with the non-
deductibility of rent, as the factor distinguishing the interest-free loan cases
from those involving the rent-free use of property." The majority asserted
this distinction as the basis for refusing to apply the line of cases holding
that the rent-free transfer of corporate property to a shareholder produces
income to the shareholder." The court's assumption that a stockholder-
recipient of a rent-free transfer of corporate property would never be enti-
tled to a tax deduction had he actually paid rent for the property is in-
accurate. Only where such property is for the recipient's personal use is a
deduction impermissible. Where the property is used for his business or in-
come producing purposes, a deduction is permitted. 38 This point was made
by Judge Opper in a concurring opinion in Dean. As an example of an
allowable deduction for constructive rent payments, Judge Opper
suggested the case where a stockholder receives the rent-free use of corpo-
rate property which the stockholder then leases to a third party:
Would the fact that [the stockholder] could presumably deduct
as a business or nonbusiness expense the hypothetical rental
value theoretically paid by him to the corporation, section 212,
I.R.C. 1954, and thereby completely offset any gross income,
lead us to conclude, as here, contrary to that whole line of cases,
that there could be no gross income in the first place?"
Thus, the Dean Court was mistaken in concluding that loan interest pay-
ments are always deductible while rental payments are always nondeduct-
33 See 1.R.C. § 63. A taxpayer will itemize his deductions only if they exceed $3,200 in
the case of a joint return or surviving spouse, $2,200 in the case of other single individuals,
and $1,600 in the case of a married individual filing separately.
34 See note 9 supra.
n J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring), citing 1.R.C. § 265(2). In-
terest deductions are disallowed in other circumstances as well. For example, no deduction
generally is allowed for any interest paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to
purchase a single premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract, I.R.C. § 264; or
fcir certain interest paid or accrued by a noncorporate taxpayer to carry investment property
which produces little or no current income, I.R.C. § 163(d)(1). In addition, interest can be de-
nied in certain sham transactions. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362-70
(1960). For examples of other instances in which an interest deduction is disallowed, see J.
CHommti..supra note 27, at § 74.
36 This criticism was made by Judge Opper in his concurring opinion. Dean, 35 T.C. at
1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
37 1d. at 1090.
3" I.R.C. §§ 162, 212.
39 Dean, 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
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ible. As has been seen, both loan interest payments and property rental
payments are deductible in some instances and nondeductible in others -.
A final weakness in the court's reasoning lies in its failure to perceive
the problem of timing involved where the date of repayment of an
interest-free loan is more than a year in the future. 4 ° In such cases, the fi-
nancial benefit is received currently and would be included in income in
the current year, but the equivalent deduction for the constructive interest
payment would be deferred more appropriately to a later year. This dif-
ference in the timing of income and deductions, which will be explored
fully in Part III of this article, is another factor distinguishing the two-
payment transaction analysis from the no-income, no-deduction approach.
The number of obvious problems with Judge Raum's analysis makes
one wonder why he wrote the opinion as he did. The most likely answer is
that, while he wanted to reach a result—no net taxable income to the
recipient—that would prove rational in most interest-free loan cases, Judge
Raum was unsure that this rational result could be reached once he held
that the economic benefit from the interest-free use of corporate funds was
income. The unexpressed fear presumably was a belief that even if such
economic benefit were included in the shareholder's income, no offsetting
interest deduction would be permitted for interest neither paid nor ac-
crued. Without the offsetting interest deduction the shareholder would be
overtaxed in a system which generally affords deductions for all interest
paid.
Professor Joseph Sneed has suggested that this possibility of overtaxa-
tion justifies the result in Dean.' While recognizing the rational force of
taxing alike the interest-free loan and its economically equivalent two-
payment transaction, 43
 Sneed concludes that it is impossible to reach the ra-
tional result once the shareholder-recipient includes the economic benefit
of an interest-free loan in income. He observes that
[b]ecause it is difficult, to say the least, to obtain an interest de-
duction for interest neither paid nor owed, the best way to make
these two economically equivalent transactions yield similar tax
results is to exclude from the gross income of [the officer or
shareholder] the economic benefits of an interest-free loan.
Although the Tax Court's opinion in f. Simpson Dean is somewhat
cryptic, its analysis, in holding an interest-free loan by a corpora-
tion to its shareholder did not result in gain to the borrower, is
consistent with that just set forth. 43
Recognizing, however, many of the objections to this no-income, no-
deduction result of Dean, Sneed concludes that the exclusion from income
'° This timing problem has escaped the attention not only of the Tax Court in Dean,
but also of commentators on that case. E.g., Baum, Effects of Stockholder Use of Corporate Prop-
erty, Including Stockholder Borrowings Deemed Dividends in Relation to Section 1341, N.Y.U. 25th
INST. ON FED. TAX 509 (1967); Duhl & Fine, supra note 2; O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free
Loans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (1974); Schlifke, Taxing As Income the Receipt of Interest-Free Loans,
33 U. Cot. L. REV. 346 (1966); Sneed, supra note 4.
41 Sneed, supra note 4, at 651-53.
" Id.
"Id. at 653.
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should apply only where if the interest actually had been paid, the deduc-
tion for that interest would, in fact, have been available to the stockholder.
If for any reason the deduction would not have been available, then Sneed
would require that the economic benefit of the interest-free loan be taxed:
[T]he test should be this. Is the interest free loan such that had it been
at interest a deduction for such interest would have been available? If
the answer is affirmative an exclusion is justified; otherwise it is
not. While some may regard use of this test as the equivalent of
inclusion accompanied by an offsetting deduction, it avoids direct
confrontation with the problem of justifying a deduction for in-
terest neither paid nor owed in fact.'"
While Professor Sneed's concern with reaching rational tax results is
entirely appropriate, he employs a bizarre view of a court's role in in-
terpreting the Internal Revenue Code. Professor Sneed first argues that a
court may not legitimately interpret the words "paid or accrued" as used in
section 163 to include constructive interest payments, 45 although, as this ar-
ticle demonstrates, such a non-literal interpretation is entirely defensible."
Then, in order to reach a rational result, while avoiding the "direct con-
frontation" of that non-literal interpretation, Professor Sneed proposes a
strange and nearly unprecedented test for the existence of gross income.'"
That test would render the existence of income dependent on the availabil-
ity of an itemized deduction offsetting the economic benefit received."
44 1d. at 655 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 652-53. Professor Sneed observed that "[do argue that an interest-free loan
generates a deduction for interest 'paid' requires an affection for paradoxes, which many do
not possess." Id. at 652 n.31.
4° See text at notes 55-61 infra.
" Professor Sneed's no-income, no-deductiOn analysis is not entirely without precedent,
but the precedent that does exist is of dubious validity. In the recent case of Donald D. Focht,
68 T.C. 223 (1977), the Tax Court held that the assumption of an obligation by a transferee
in connection with a nontaxable incorporation will not produce taxable gain to the transferor
under I.R.C. § 357(c) to the extent that the obligation would have been deductible by the
transferor had he paid it. The Tax Court relied heavily on a footnote in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1946). The Supreme Court held in Crane that
the amount realized on a tranf'er of property subject to a mortgage includes the amount of the
mortgage. Id. at 13. The Court did not, however, include in the amount realized the mortgage
interest which the transferor had not yet paid or deducted, since the I.R.S. had conceded that
the principal alone would enter into the amount realized. The I.R.S. made this concession be-
cause the transferor would have been entitled to a deduction for the interest had she paid it.
The Supreme Court noted the Service's concession, without comment, in a footnote in Crane.
Id. at 4 n.6. The Tax Court's reliance in Focht on the Crane fUotnote is unjustified since that
footnote represented merely the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of a concession by the
government attorney trying the case and did not constitute a holding. Moreover, the Crane
footnote's approach would lead to an erroneous result in cases involving the transfer of a capi-
-tal asset. Under a two-payment analysis, the amount of unpaid interest would be included in
the amount realized and so would constitute capital gains, while the offsetting interest deduc-
tion would have been ordinary. For these reasons the footnote in Crane can hardly be deemed
to constitute adequate precedent for adoption of the no-income, no-deduction approach urged
by Professor Sneed. For a view of the Crane footnote as supporting the approach in Focht, see
Kahn & Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in Internal Revenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73
MICH. L. REV. 461 (1975).
"There are a few other situations where the existence of gross income may turn on the
availability to the taxpayer of an offsetting itemized deduction. For example, the cancellation
by a creditor of a cash basis debtor's obligation to pay him interest might result in no income
to the debtor. See Eustice, Cancellation of indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of
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Moreover, Sneed's roundabout approach in fact would not resolve many of
the problems of the no-income, no-deduction approach previously dis-
cussed. 49
Yet, with all its defects, the Sneed approach produces, in most cases,
the logical result: no net taxable income for the shareholder or employee
recipient of an interest-free loan. The same claim cannot be made for those
commentators"—with whom the I.R.S. apparently agrees 51 —who would
have the recipient recognize income from an interest-free loan but would
not permit him an offsetting deduction. For example, Professor James T.
O'Hare, in a recent article on the subject, concluded that the correct
analysis of an interest-free loan from corporation to shareholder is "div-
idend income that should not be offset by an interest deduction for un-
paid interest."52
 The asymmetry of O'Hare's conclusion apparently stems
from the same statutory interpretation problem that influenced Professor
Sneed and perhaps the majority in Dean; in Professor Sneed's words, "it is
difficult, to say the least, to obtain an interest deduction for interest neither
paid or owed."53
As has been demonstrated, Professor O'Hare is correct in concluding
that the borrower receives dividend income from the economic benefit of
the interest-free loan. 54
 He seems to be troubled by the concept of a deduc-
tion for constructive interest payments. That this difficulty is more appar-
ent than real will be demonstrated in the next section.
B. Is the Shareholder-Borrower Entitled to an Interest Deduction
Under Section 163?
If the interest-free loan is to have the same tax consequences for the
shareholder-borrower as the economically equivalent two-payment cash
transaction in which the shareholder receives an additional cash dividend
which he pays as interest to the corporation, then not only must the recip-
Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225, 252-53 (1959). The other side of the coin is illustrated
by Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 226-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975),
in which a taxpayer was deemed to have realized gross income on the receipt of unsolicited
sample textbooks because he tranferred those books to charity and took a charitable deduc-
tion. Accord, Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6.
" See text at notes 24-40 supra. The only problem resolved by Professor Sneed's ap-
proach is that of the case where an offsetting deduction would not be available under a two-
payment analysis. See text at notes 31-35 supra.
" E.g., O'Hare, supra note 40, at 1096, Schlifke, supra note 40, at 353-58. Schlifke pro-
poses a variety of esoteric alternatives for taxing the employee or shareholder-recipient of an
interest-free loan; Schlifke, supra note 40, at 354-58; none of the alternatives, however, is the
straightforward one of taxing the recipient on the economic value of the interest-free loan,
and giving him an offsetting interest deduction in the same amount.
5 ' The I.R.S. has announced its nonacquiescence to the Dean case. 1973-2 C.B. 4. This
clearly indicates its belief that there is income to the shareholder-recipient of an interest-free
loan to the extent of the economic benefit derived from the loan. Exactly what the Service's
nonacquiescence means with respect to the offsetting interest deduction issue is less clear,
although presumably the I.R.S. would not allow the dividend income to be offset by an in-
terest deduction. A number of commentators have assumed this to be the Service's position.
E.g., Duhl and Fine, supra note 2, at 35; O'Hare, supra note 40, at 1096.
52
 O'Hare, supra note 40, at 1096.
" Sneed, supra note 4, at 653. See O'Hare, supra note 40, at 1095.
54
 Recognition of dividend income depends, of course, on the presence of sufficient
earnings and profits. See note 13 supra.
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ient realize income equal to the economic benefit derived from the loan,
but he also must be entitled to an offsetting itemized deduction in the same
amount, assuming only that an interest deduction would have been avail-
able to him had interest actually been paid. Once the interest value of an
interest-free loan is recognized and taken into income, to permit its recip-
ient to take a deduction for interest not actually "paid or accrued" would
be far from revolutionary. Such an approach is analogous to the well-
established practice of recognizing a cost basis in property which a taxpayer
literally receives at no cost. but includes in income.
Recognition of a basis in such property requires a broad, non-literal
interpretation of the word "cost" in section 1012, which identifies basis
simply as "cost." Applied literally, section 1012 would preclude any basis
where, for example, an employee receives property as compensation. Yet it
has long been accepted in these circumstances that the employee's basis in
the property is the amount at which the property was includable in in-
come." Referring to the cost basis practice, Professor Ernest Brown has
written that just such a non-literal understanding of the term "cost" is
necessary "to give the statute the quality of rationality."" In his well-known
piece on The Crowing "Common Law" of Taxation, Professor Brown
hypothesizes the case of a taxpayer who receives an automobile valued at
$5,000 as a bonus from his employer or as a prize in a lottery." The tax-
payer reports the automobile's value as income, and soon thereafter decides
to sell it for cash.
Its value, let us say $5,000, is clearly income to him when re-
ceived. He reports it as such and pays the appropriate tax. But
he decides that such a car is beyond his needs and style and sells
it for cash. What is the tax result? What is his basis? Search the
statute as we will, all we can find is "cost". And what is cost? Lit-
erally in the case of the lottery prize, it is the price of the ticket.
" See, e.g., Smith v. Russell, 76 F.2d 91, 92 (8th Gin 1935), Col. denied, 296 U.S. 614
(1936); E.D. Knight, 28 B.T:A. 188, 190 (1933); J. •eninger, 9 B.T.A. 1318, 1320 (1928); B.
BirrKER & L. STONE, supra note 14, at 464; 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANiEt, & H.
ALLT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 838 (1972); Brown, The Growing 'Common Law' al Taxation,
1961 So. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 7.8; Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be The Cost ry' Such Prop-
erty: How is Cost Defined? 3 'I'm( L. REv, 351, 360-61 (1948); Wurzel, The Tax Basis for Assorted
Bargain Purchase or: The Inordinate Cost of "Ersatz" Legislation, 20 TAX L. Rt:v 165, 175 (1964-
65).
An individual shareholder who receives property as a dividend includes in income the
fair market value of the property and takes that value for the property's basis. Since 1954,
J.R.C. 301(d)(1) has specifically provided for a fair market value result. However, even prior
to 1954 it was quite clear that a shareholder receiving a property distribution took a cost basis
in the property equal to its fair market value, even though, literally, he had no "cost" in the
property.
It must be recognized that the cost of a taxable distribution in kind is not the
same necessarily as its cost in an economic or accounting sense. The tax detri-
ment to the stockholder resulting from the receipt of a property dividend should
be taken into account in the determination of its cost. Consequently, the "cost" of
a taxable property dividend generally is accepted to be its fair market value at
the time of receipt.
Greenbaum, supra, at 376.
"I Brown, supra note 55, at 8.
57 Brown, supra note 55, at 7-8.
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But we should all be startled if our taxpayer were required to
pay a tax on the value of the car when he received it and
another tax on all, or almost all, of the proceeds of the sale. So
we should, I am sure, stretch the word "cost" almost out of recognizable
shape to make it mean the amount at which the car was taken into in-
come, and we should feel justified in doing so in order to give the statute
the quality of rationality."
When Professor Brown speaks of giving the statute "the quality of ra-
tionality," he obviously means that it would be irrational to tax a person
who received a $5,000 automobile differently from the similarly situated
taxpayer who received $5,000 cash and purchased the automobile. Now, if
Professor Brown were asked whether a taxpayer who received an interest-
free loan, the economic benefit of which he was required to take into in-
come, should be able to take a deduction for interest neither paid nor
owed, presumably his answer would be:
[W]e should, I am sure, stretch the words "interest paid or ac-
crued"] almost out of recognizable shape to make [them] mean
the amount at which the [interest-free loan] was taken into in-
come and we should feel justified in doing so in order to give
the statute the quality of rationality.
The recommended non-literal reading of section 163 is supported by
the opinion of the concurring judge in the Dean case.58 There, Judge
Opper assumed that a shareholder-officer who received the rent-free use
of corporate property, which he then rented to another, would have gross
income equal to the fair rental value of the property, but could then "pre-
sumably deduct as a business or non-business expense [under sections 162
or 212] the hypothetical rental value [taken into income and] theoretically
paid by him to the corporation."°° Judge Opper was not concerned that an
amount "theoretically paid" might not fit within the term "expenses paid or
incurred." Rather, Judge Opper's readiness to permit a deduction for an
amount that is "paid" only in a constructive sense demonstrates that a lit-
eral reading of the tax statutes is not unavoidable. As Judge Opper appar-
ently recognized, permitting the deduction of an amount that is paid in a
merely hypothetical sense is the only analysis that will give the statute "the
quality of rationality." The words "paid or accrued," in section 163 must
58 Id. (emphasis added). Professor Brown goes on to note that "[pirior to 1954, we
would have been faced with the same problem [of reading the word "cost" in a non-literal
fashion] had our taxpayer sold property received as a dividend in kind, but section 301(d)(1)
has now filled that gap . ..." Id.
39 See 35 T.C. at 1091 (Upper, J., bconcurring). See text at note 39 supra. Judge Upper,
in his example concerning the recipient's right to offset his income by a business or a non-
business expense, was actually construing the words "paid or incurred," rather than "paid or
accrued," but the slight difference in wording is probably not significant to his interpretation.
Under 1.R.C, § 163, a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for "all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on indebtedness." On the other hand, both I.R.C. § 162 (ordinary and
necessary business expenses) and § 212 (ordinary and necessary expenses for the production
of income) allow a taxpayer a deduction for expenses "paid or incurred."
" 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring). If, in Judge Upper's example, the
shareholder were in control of the distributing corporation, it is possible that I.R.C. 482
would be applicable to the transfer. See, e.g., Revel D. Cooper, 64 T.C. 576, 580 (1975).
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not, therefore, be applied literally. Rather, "paid or accrued," like the term
"cost," should be considered a technical lax concept which possesses the
flexibility necessary to achieve a rational result."'
There appears to be no authority specifically rejecting the suggested
non-literal reading of "paid or accrued." It is true that in the Dean case, the
majority said that it had previously given "full force to interest-free loans
for tax purposes" by "holding that they result in no interest deduction for
the borrower."' However, not one of the cases cited in Dean for this no-
deduction proposition 63 actually explored the broad issue of whether a tax-
payer who received an interest-free loan, and reported the fair interest rate
as income, could take an offsetting deduction for interest paid." Rather,
those cases focused on a narrower issue—whether interest-free loans could
be converted retroactively by the taxpayer-recipient into interest-bearing
loans for purposes of obtaining an interest deduction. The case of Howell
Turpentine Co." is typical. There, a taxpayer had borrowed money on open
account, over a nine year period, from a corporation of which he was the
principal stoekholder. 66 At no time was the taxpayer subject to any obliga-
tion to pay interest, and he paid none." He neither reported income at-
" Both the I.R.S. and the courts have often interpreted the words "paid or accrued" or
"paid or incurred" in the non-literal fashion necessary to achieve rational tax results. For
example, in Rev. Rul. 73-13, 1973-1 C.B. 42, a corporation engaged and paid a professional
counseling firm to counsel a number of its highly paid executives concerning the handling of
their personal financial affairs. The Service ruled that the particular executive involved in the
ruling had realized income equal to the fee paid on his behalf, but was entitled to an equal
offsetting deduction under I.R.C. § 212 for the ordinary and necessary expenses "paid" for
financial counseling. This was the Service's ruling, even though the financial counseling ex-
pense was neither literally "paid" by the executive, nor literally an expense of the executive at
all. It was the payor corporation, and not the executive which had contracted for the services
of the counseling firm, and which was liable for its fee. Likewise, where a corporation pays
any other deductible expense of a shareholder, that shareholder receives gross income in the
amount of the corporation's payment, but is entitled to an offsetting deduction for an expense
he literally does not pay himself. E.g., Earl E. Cloud, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 597 (1974); Donald G.
Peters, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1440 (1970) (deduction allowed for property taxes paid by in-
termediary). See also Rev. Rul, 69-497, 1969-2 C.B. 23.
52 35 T.C. at 1090.
The cases cited for this proposition were D. Loveman & Son Export Corporation, 34
T.C. 776 (1960); Howell Turpentine Co., 6 T.c. 364 (1946), rend on other grounds, 162 F.2d
316 (5th Cir. 1947); Rainbow Gasoline Corporation, 31 B.T.A. 1050 (1935); A. Backus, Jr. &
Sons, 6 E.T.A, 590 (1927). It must be admitted that these cases contain some general language
which, read literally, counsels against permitting a deduction. In Loveman, for instance, the
court adverted to the "general rule—that interest may not be accrued where there is no obli-
gation to pay interest," 34 T.C. at 805, and then discussed !laurel' Turpentine as support for
this broad statement. Yet Howell Turpentine, as shall be shown, does not justify so broad a rule.
Even assuming that the court previously has given force to this "general rule," it would
nonetheless appear advisable for the court to abandon the rule in those situations where its
application would produce illogical results.
5-1 One case, not cited in Dean, did suggest a reason why the recipient of an interest-free
loan would not be entitled to an interest deduction. In Wilbur Security Co., 31 T.C. 938
(1959), the Tax Court characterized an interest-free loan as "a withdrawal of capital, later re-
invested." Id. at 952. A withdrawal of capital differs from an interest-free loan, however, be-
cause the former involves no obligation of repayment . . Consideration of transfers which are
not bona fide loans is beyond the scope of this article, See note 3 supra.
65 6 'LC. 364 (1946).
"Id. at 374-75.
" ld. at 394.
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tributable to the interest-free loans, nor attempted to obtain a deduction
for interest paid." At the end of the nine-year period, however, the tax-
payer repaid the principal, plus an amount allegedly representing interest
at six percent on the average daily balances owed the corporation during
the nine year period." The court disallowed the taxpayer's claimed deduc-
tion for interest paid or accrued because there was no obligation to pay in-
terest at any time prior to the payment." It is significant that the court did
not address the broader question of whether the interest-free loans them-
selves resulted in income and/or a deduction to the borrower. As a result,
Howell Turpentine does not forbid the recognition of both income and de-
duction in interest-free loan cases. In the absence of any authority clearly
rejecting the suggested non-literal interpretation of the words "paid or ac-
crued," it seems reasonable to aim for the logical result by granting the
borrower an interest deduction.
In summary, the shareholder receiving an interest-free loan should be
treated identically with the economically equivalent taxpayer who receives a
cash dividend and pays interest in discharge of a bona fide obligation. Both
taxpayers should recognize income in the amount of the actual or construc-
tive dividend and both should be permitted a deduction in the equivalent
amount of the actual or constructive interest payment.
C. Does the Corporation-Lender Realize Interest Income?
If a corporation makes a loan to a stockholder, receives $1,000 in-
terest thereon, and pays $1,000 to the stockholder as an increased
dividend—the two-payment transaction—the corporation will be taxable on
the $1,000 interest it receives, and, of course, will not be entitled to a de-
duction for the $1,000 dividend paid. Yet a corporation that makes an
interest-free loan to its stockholders and is in the identical economic posi-
tion escapes tax altogether."
A number of commentators have recognized the illogic of this latter
result72
 and one has suggested specifically that the corporate lender of an
interest-free loan be taxed on the constructive interest received." Yet it
appears that the Treasury has never claimed that the corporate lender re-
ceived constructive interest and therefore the courts have never considered
the question. 74
68 Id. at 374-75.
" Id.
"I Id. at 394.
" Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416, 447 (1960); Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18
T.C. 304, 320.21 (1952); Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339, 342-43 (1940).
"E.g., Baum, supra note 40, at 520-21; Sneed, supra note 4, at 660-61.
" Sneed, supra note 4, at 660-61 (emphasis in original), suggests the following test:
Is the interest-free loan such that had it been at interest the lender would have been entitled
to deduct the interest so earned had he paid it over to the borrower? If the answer is af-
firmative, an exclusion [of the constructive interest income] is justified, otherwise
it is not.
Since dividends are not deductible, this test results in taxing the corporate lender of an
interest-free loan. An opposite result is favored by O'Hare, supra note 40, at 1096, who not
only does not suggest taxing the corporate lender, but uses the nontaxation of the corporate
lender as justification for not giving the shareholder-borrower an interest deduction. O'Hare's
views on the shareholder's deduction are described in the text at notes 51-52 supra.
" See Baum, supra note 40, at 515.
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In this section of the article, it will be argued that there is ample au-
thority in the line of cases dealing with the anticipatory assignment of in-
come for taxing such constructive interest to the corporate lender. It also
will be suggested that the failure of the Treasury and the courts to tax such
income may be the result of their misunderstanding of the scope and pur-
pose of the concept of "imputed income."
1. An Interest-Free Loan as a Corporate Assignment of Income
The major stumbling block to taxing a corporate lender of an
interest-free loan on the constructive receipt of interest is found in the Su-
preme Court's 1935 decision in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helver-
ing74 and its statutory progeny, section 311 (a) (2). 7U The case and the Code
section stand for the proposition that a corporation realizes no gain or loss
from the distribution of appreciated or depreciated property as a dividend
to its shareholders." In other words, a corporation that distributes prop-
erty to its shareholders will not be taxed in the same manner as the corpo-
ration that, in a two-payment transaction, distributes a cash dividend equal
to the value of the property, and receives the same cash amount back from
its shareholder as the purchase price of the property, despite the fact that
the transactions are economically equivalent..The government's argument
in General Utilities that "it [was] incomprehensible how a corporation [could]
distribute to its stockholders something which it [had] not itself received""
was ignored by the Supreme Court. Thus, under the principles of General
Utilities and section 311(a) (2) a corporation can distribute something of
value, such as the element of appreciation, without ever paying tax on its
receipt." As a result, General Utilities and section 311(a) (2) block a direct
logical approach to taxing the corporate lender of an interest-free loan-
i.e., an approach that would state that a corporation itself receives any
value which it transfers to a shareholder and which it has not included pre-
" 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
76
 1.R.C. § 311(a)(2) provides that, with certain exceptions, no gain or loss shall be rec-
ognized to a corporation on the distribution, with respect to its stock, of property.
" In fact, the Supreme Court in General Utilities never decided the nonrecognition point
for which it became known. It decided only that because the dividend in that case was de-
clared in the appreciated property rather than in cash, the dividend declaration did not create
an indebtedness to the shareholders such that the distribution of the appreciated property in
satisfaction of the dividend would cause the corporation to realize income. 296 U.S. at 202,
206. See B. Birriux EUSTICE, supra note 3, 11 7.21, at 7-40 n.78. Nevertheless, the General
Utilities case "has received judicial and administrative acceptance as standing for the proposi-
tion that a corporation does not realize income from the distribution (as a dividend) of prop-
erty which has appreciated in value over its cost," Commissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d
529, 531 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 (1954).
" B. 1311-rxElit de J. EUS•ICE, supra note 3, i 7.21, at 7-40 n.78 (quoting government's
brief to the Supreme Court in the General Utilities case).
19
 The result reached by General Utilities and J.R.C.	 311(a)(2) has been subjected to
much well deserved criticism. See, e.g., Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Dis-
tributions and Sales in Liquidation, in HOUSE COMMErEEE ON WAYS AND MEANS. 3 TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM 1643, 1645-49, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). A recent draft by the American Law
Institute, amending Subchapter C, would eliminate § 311. ALI, FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT
SUBCHAPTER C 122-3 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1977).
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viously in income." However, it has long been accepted that neither Gen-
eral Utilities nor section 311 (a) (2) stands in the way of taxing a corporation
on an in kind distribution "which distribution is in effect an anticipatory as-
signment of income." 8 ' For example, a corporate owner of a bond that de-
taches interest coupons from that bond and transfers them to a sharehold-
er as a dividend, would remain taxable on the interest derived from those
transferred coupons under the "common law" doctrine of assignment of
income." Applying Justice Holmes' classic fruit tree metaphor of Lucas v.
Earl, 83 the corporation in the above example may not retain the tree
(bonds) and transfer the fruit (the right to interest) and escape taxation on
that fruit (interest).
The interest-free loan from a corporation to shareholder appears to
be nothing more than another example of a corporate attempt to assign in-
come to its shareholders. The corporation retains the tree (the right to be
repaid the principal sum of the loan at maturity) but transfers the fruit (the
use of the money during the period of the loan) to its shareholders. The
value of the fruit, that is, the constructive interest, should be taxed as in-
come to the assignor (the corporation)."
80 If § 3 1 1 were eliminated from the Code as suggested by the recent American Law In-
stitute Draft, see ALI, supra note 79, the direct analysis used in Part II infra, for taxing the
employer transferring an interest-free loan to an employee would seem equally applicable to
the situation of the corporation making a like transfer to a shareholder.
8 ' Treas. Reg. § 1.311-1(a). The regulation's interpretation of the Code section is sup-
ported by the legislative history. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1954) (Senate re-
port on Code § 311). See also Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004,
1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit
and Tree As Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295, 396 (1962).
" The "common law" doctrine of assignment of income is best exemplified by the Su-
preme Court's classic decision in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In Horst, a taxpayer
had detached interest coupons from some negotiable bonds shortly before their due date and
had given them to his son. The son, in the same year, collected the interest at maturity. The
Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's ruling that the interest coupons were taxable to
the donor in the year paid, even though the donor had kept his books on a cash receipts basis
and had never received the interest in cash. Id. at 115-16, 120. The interest coupons in Horst
were the fruit produced by the "tree" of the father's investment. In transferring the interest to
his son, the father enjoyed the "nonmaterial satisfaction" of giving something of value to a
loved one. Id. at 117. This non-material satisfaction could be valued at the amount of the in-
terest.
" 281 U.S. 111, 117 (1930). In Lucas v. Earl, the Court held that despite a contract be-
tween a husband and wife which provided that they would receive and hold all income as joint
tenants, income earned by the husband was taxable to him. Id. at 114-15.
8 ' See Treas. Reg. § I.311-1(a) (1960). The conclusion that the corporate transferor of
an interest-free loan recognizes income on the transfer in a manner similar to that of the anti-
cipatory assignment of income cases is supported by the language used by courts in the as-
signment of income cases. For example, in Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948), a bank distributed as a dividend to its
shareholders, promissory notes that it previously had written off as worthless but which were
thought by the bank to have some value at the time of distribution. The court held that the
corporation realized income when the shareholders collected those notes. Paraphrasing lan-
guage from Horst, the Fifth Circuit said:
Even though the bank never received the money, it derived money's worth from
the disposition of the notes which it used in place of money in procuring a satis-
faction that was procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's worth.
The enjoyment of the economic benefit was realized as completely as it would have been if
the bank had collected the notes in dollars and cents and paid the money as a dividend to
its shareholders. . . .
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Despite this clear analogy to the assignment of income cases, the
granting of an interest-free loan by a corporation to a shareholder has
never been held to result in realized income to the corporation under the
assignment of income doctrine. This is perhaps because the courts and the
Treasury have considered the income that would have to be assigned back
to the corporation--i.e. the constructive interest—as "imputed income,"
and therefore non-taxable to anyone under our tax system. 85 The following
analysis demonstrates the invalidity of this conclusion.
2. Taxable In-Kind Income or Nontaxable Imputed Income
The classic definition of "imputed income" is as follows:
Imputed income may be defined provisionally as a flow of satis-
factions from durable goods owned and used by the taxpayer, or
from goods and services arising out of the personal exertions of
the taxpayer on his own behalf."
The imputed income described by this definition—for example, the im-
puted rental income of a homeowner, the imputed wages and profits aris-
ing from services one renders to one's family or oneself—is not taxed
under the Code.
If the benefit that a corporation derives from the transfer to its
shareholders of interest-free loans is imputed income, the corporation
should not be taxed thereon. However, the constructive interest income to
the corporate grantor of an interest-free loan in no relevant way resembles
that described in the definition of imputed income. The definition indicates
that an essential aspect of imputed income is that the satisfaction flows di-
rectly to the owner of the goods or provider of the services.
The corporate-lender of an interest-free loan does not derive a "flow
of satisfaction" from using its goods—its cash—itself and accordingly does
not receive imputed income. Rather, by disposing of its right to collect in-
terest to a separate taxable entity—its shareholders—the corporate lender
receives non-cash income, or "income in kind."'" This income in kind con-
sists of the economic benefit the corporation derives from satisfying its
general obligation to pay dividends to its shareholders. Thus, as a theoreti-
cal matter, the transfer of the economic value of the temporary use of
money does not fit the definition of nontaxable imputed income.
... The acquisition of profits for its shareholders was the purpose of its
creation. The collection of interest on loans was a principal source of its income.
The payment of dividends to its shareholders was the enjoyment of its income, A
body corporate can be said to enjoy its income in no other way. Like the "life-
rendering pelican," it feeds its shareholders upon dividends.
Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
115 Sneed, supra note 4, at 660 states:
It has been pointed out that the flow of satisfactions from owned property is a
form of imputed income which is not subject to tax. This may well justify the
present state of case-law authority which holds that the lender in an interest-free
loan has no income.
no Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 Pcn,, Sci. Q. 514, 514 (1943).
" Professor Sneed has defined income in kind as "gain ... received in a form other than
money or its verry near equivalent." Sneed, supra note 4, at 644 (emphasis in original).
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Moreover, the policy reasons often advanced for excluding from tax
certain forms of imputed income seem entirely inapplicable to the corpo-
rate lender's situation. For example, the exclusion of most imputed wage
income is said to be unobjectionable on equity grounds since first, such in-
come generally arises from the use of otherwise nontaxable leisure time
and second, it normally goes largely to individuals in lower income brack-
ets." Obviously, neither of these considerations is in any way relevant to
the exclusion of the constructive interest income here under discussion.
The constructive interest income does not arise from the use of otherwise
nontaxable leisure time; nor is it likely that low income individuals would
normally receive the benefit of interest-free loans from corporations to
shareholders. Other items of imputed income should be excluded, it is said,
because of the smallness of the amount involved in relation to the difficulty
of computation by the taxpayer and the government. However, as the Dean
case illustrates, the constructive interest involved may be anything but
small. In Dean, the corporation had outstanding more than two million dol-
lars in interest-free loans." Another policy reason often asserted on behalf
of the exclusion from income of imputed rental income on owner-occupied
homes is that such exclusion encourages home ownership.'" However,
there is no indication that Congress similarly intended to encourage div-
idends in the form of interest-free loans rather than in cash. Thus, none of
the traditional policy justifications for the exclusion from tax of imputed
income apply to the interest-free loan from corporation to shareholder.
The only general policy consideration that would exclude from taxa-
tion both the traditional forms of imputed income and the constructive in-
terest income on an interest-free loan is related to the difficulties involved
in computing the income. Yet it must be remembered that although valua-
tion difficulties exist whenever a taxpayer receives income in kind rather
than in cash, those difficulties have not prevented the I.R.S. or the courts
from determining and taxing a shareholder or employee on the fair market
value of the economic benefit he receives as income, whether the economic
benefit takes the form of property, services, or the rent-free use of prop-
erty.'" Similarly, there is no convincing reason why the recipient of an
interest-free loan should not be taxed on the economic benefit received.
Once the taxation of the shareholder-borrower is accepted, there is no ad-
ditional valuation problem involved in taxing the corporation-lender, since
the same figure will be used to tax both."
" Marsh, supra note 86, at 525.
as 35 T.C. at 1083.
" Marsh, supra note 86, at 536.
" See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, supra note 15,
at 158-60.
" This valuation problem is analogous to the one involved where a corporation uses
appreciated property to pay an employee's salary. The employee's income is the Fair market
value of the property received, and the corporation's amount realised is that same value. E.g.,
International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943). Cf. United
States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12-14 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843
(1961) (transfer of appreciated property to an employees' trust); Tasty Baking Co. v. United
States, 393 F.2d 992, 995 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (same). "[T]he values of the two properties exchanged
in an arms-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal." United
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962), quoting Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United
States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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3. The Absence of Any Reasoned Authority For Not Taxing the
Corporation-Lender
Since neither tax logic nor administrative necessity dictates exempting
the corporate lender of an interest-free loan from tax, it is not surprising
that there exists no reasoned authority that requires this result. Yet the Tax
Court in Dean misleadingly suggested that such authority existed by stating
that "fwle have heretofore given full force to interest-free loans for tax
purposes, holding that they result in no „ interest income to the lender
...."93 An examination of the cases cited as authority for this point by the
Tax Court indicates, however, that although such cases impliedly held that
the corporate transferor of an interest-free loan does not receive income,
their implicit holdings lack any reasoned foundation. In each of the three
cases cited in Dean, the court simply assumed, without discussion, that the
corporate lender should not be taxed. However, the issue before the court
in each case was whether or not the specific loan actually was intended to
be interest-free. In each case the lender successfully sought escape from the
taxation of interest income by oral evidence that no interest was intended,
despite the existence of a stated interest figure on a form note." 4 As the fol-
lowing quotation from the hoard of Tax Appeals' decision in Combs Lumber
Co.," indicates, once the factual question of intention was decided, so was
the case:
While the notes here given formally provided for interest, it is
clearly established by the evidence that the parties intended that
no interest should be charged or paid. In pursuance of such in-
tention no interest was in fact paid and no interest was ever ac-
crued by petitioner on its books. As no liability for interest was
ever created, the respondent erred in including the interest in
controversy in petitioner's gross income."
Combs Lumber thus assumes without discussion that a loan intended to be
interest-free results in no income to a corporate lender.
The two other cases cited by Dean," Society Brands Clothes, Inc.," 8 and
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc.," each involved a factual situation identical to that.
in Combs Lumber Co. In both cases, the Tax Court found that no interest
was intended, and concluded, therefore, that the corporate lender had no
income.'°° Society Brands Clothes cited Combs Lumber Company as its author-
ity,'" and Brandtjen & Kluge cited as its authority, both Combs Lumber and
P3 35 T.C. at 1090, citing Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940); Society Brands
Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960).
94 Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. at 447: Society Brands Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. at
320-21; Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. at 340-41.
954 1 B.T.A. 339 (1940),
"Id. at 342-43.
P7 35 T.C. at 1090.
"" 18 T.C. 304 (1952).
v" 34 T.C. 416 (1960).
um Society Brand, 18 T.C. at 320-21; Brandtjen,	 T.C. at 447.
"" Society Brand, 18 T.C. at 321.
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Society Brands Clothes.'" Accordingly the cases cited for the proposition that
a corporation realizes no income when it issues an interest-free loan do not
constitute persuasive precedent. 103
It is clear that the case law dealing with the tax treatment of a corpo-
rate lender of an interest-free loan rests upon the unexplored, and un-
explained, assumption that the corporate lender is not taxable on the con-
structive interest received. This assumption may have been the result of the
inaccurate application of the term "imputed" to this in-kind income, to-
gether with a conditioned reflex declaration that "imputed" income is non-
taxable. However, in the absence of any reasoned authority for not rec-
ognizing interest income to the corporate lender, courts should permit the
analogy to Helvering v. Horst and the other assignment of income cases to
control, so that the corporation will be taxed on the interest income.
11. THE INTEREST-FREE LOAN FROM AN EMPLOYER TO AN EMPLOYEE
Interest-free loans from employer to employee give rise to many of
the considerations discussed in relation to similar loans from corporation to
shareholder. The applicable case law, however, differs in certain respects in
the two contexts, and so separate analysis is required. This section will
examine loans from employer to employee, addressing first, the employee's
tax consequences and then, those of the employer.
A. The Tax Consequences to the Employee
Like the shareholder receiving an interest-free loan as a dividend, the
employee receiving additional compensation in the form of an interest-free
loan should be taxed as if he had received additional cash compensation
which he then used to pay interest on the loan. That is, he should have ad-
ditional compensation income equal to the economic benefit derived from
the interest-free loan. If he would have been entitled to an interest deduc-
tion had he actually paid interest, he should then be permitted an offset-
ting deduction.
The analysis of the employee-borrower's tax status is virtually identical
to that discussed for the shareholder-borrower in sections A and B of Part
I and accordingly will not be repeated here. 104
102
 Brandtjen, 34 T.C. at 447. The Tax Court in Brandtjen & Kluge, low, also cited the
similar case of Wilbur Security Co., 31 T.C. 938 (1959), affd, 279 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1960).
Two other cases often cited for the proposition that a corporation realizes no income when it
issues an interest-free loan (or gives rent-free use of its property) are equally unilluminating.
Smith-Bridgman & Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 287 (1951), and Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel
Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940) (both decided under the predecessor of
MC. § 482) simply assumed, like the three cases discussed in the text, that there could be no
interest (or rental) income realized where none was, in fact, charged. In Tennessee-Arkansas the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the corporate grantor of the rent-free use of property could not
have rental income allocated to it when it "neither charged, collected or could have collected
rent under its agreement." 112 F.2d at 510. In Smith-Bridgman the Tax Court accepted the
taxpayer's contention that the Commissioner had "merely created fictitious interest income
where none in fact existed." 16 T.C. at 293.
'" Nonetheless, the Service is still citing these cases and applying the rule that interest-
free loans produce no income to the lender. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7731007 (April 29, 1977).
"'See text at notes 13-70 supra.
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B. Does the Employer-Lender Realize Interest Income?
If the interest-free loan from an employer to an employee is to be
taxed the same way as the economically equivalent two-payment transac-
tion, the employer-lender must be deemed to realize interest income, from
which it normally could deduct a business expense in the same amount for
compensation paid. Yet it appears, under existing law, that the employer
granting an interest-free loan to an employee will have neither income nor
a deduction. The subject of the employer's income will be discussed first.
The case of Reynard Corporation' JS raised this very income issue in re-
lation to a corporation which had transferred the rent-Free use of its prop-
erty to its president and sole stockholder, Fox. The Board of Tax Appeals
concluded that Fox had additional compensation income,'" but held, with-
out stating reasons, that the rental value of the premises was improperly
included in the gross income of the employer, Reynard.'" The illogic of
that result was pointed out by the dissenting judge who stated that,
The majority opinion, although it approves the charging of the
petitioner, Fox, with additional compensation for the rental value
of the corporation's residence which he used during the taxable
years, reverses the action of the respondent in including this
identical rental value in the corporation's income for the same
years. I think the decision upon this latter action inconsistent
with the former and erroneous. This amount, recognized as
compensation to Fox from the corporation, must be treated as
having been constructively paid to the corporation as rental, and
therefore taxable income, to it, before it can be held to have been
paid by the corporation to Fox.'° 8
In 1964, the Internal Revenue Service announced its acquiescence in the
Board's determination that the Reynard Corporation had no income on the
rent-free transfer of its property to its employee.'"
10) There were two Reynard Corporation cases: Reynard Corp., 30 B.T,A. 45l (1934)
(involving the taxpayer's fiscal years ended March 31, 1930 and 1931) and Reynard Corp„ 37
B.T.A. 552 (1938) (involving the taxpayer's fiscal year ended March 31, 1932). In the first
Reynard case, the Board of Tax Appeals held that a corporation that allowed its employee to
use corporate property rent-free did not realize income equal to the fair rental value of the
property. Nevertheless the court hinted that the corporation might have been entitled to a
business deduction equal to the fair rental value of the property transferred had it been able
to prove that that fair rental value plus the cash salary paid constituted reasonable compensa-
tion for that employee. 30 B.T.A. at 454. In the second Reynard case, however, the Board of
Tax Appeals clarified its first decision. It said that, whether or not th'e total compensation was
reasonable, Reynard Corporation could not deduct the fair rental value of t he property trans-
ferred since it was not charged, for tax purposes, with fair rental value income. 37 R.T.A. at
559-60.
10° Reynard Corp., 30 B,T.A. at 453. Only the first Reynard case dealt with the tax con-
sequences to the shareholder-president.
107 Id. an 454. The inclusion of that rental value in Reynard Corporation's income would
have resulted in a net increase in the corporation's taxable income. No offsetting business de-
duction would have been permitted for salary paid, since the corporation did not prove that
the total salary paid, including the rent-free use of the property, was reasonable. Id.
10e Id at 454-55 (emphasis in original).
"° 1964-2 C.B. 7.
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This no-income result for an employer transferring its property to its
employee without charge is even more difficult to justify than the same re-
sult where the transfer is by a corporation to a shareholder. In the latter
situation, the issue of income realization to the corporation was clouded by
the Supreme Court's decision in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helver-
ing,"° which permitted a corporation without recognizing gain to distribute
appreciated property to its shareholders, and that case's statutory offshoot,
section 311(a)(2). 1 " In the corporation-shareholder transfer situation,
therefore, authority to tax the corporate lender of an interest-free loan was
found by resort to the assignment of income line of cases.'" But in the
compensation area, the approach can be more direct, by virtue of an anal-
ogy to the line of cases which describe an employer's tax consequences on
its transfer of appreciated property to its employees or employees' trust." 3
These cases indicate that when an employer pays its employees in-kind
compensation the employer is treated as having received consideration in
exchange.
For example, in Tasty Baking Co. v. United States,'" a case involving the
contribution of appreciated property by an employer to an employees' re-
tirement trust, the Court of Claims held that the employer realized a capi-
tal gain measured by the difference between the. fair market value of the
property transferred and the employer's basis for that property." 5 The
court explained the result in language which seems equally applicable to
the interest-free loan transfer:
The underlying rationale would appear to be that though no
money or other tangible property was received by the taxpayer-
employer, the property contributed was additional compensation
for the employees' ... services, ... plus the expectation of con-
tinued services in the future. The value of those services has
been held to be presumably equal to the fair market value of the
property contributed."
Thus, based both on tax logic, and the precedent provided by the
property transfer cases, it must be concluded that when an employer makes
an interest-free loan to an employee, it receives from that employee a quid
pro quo in the form of the employee's services equal to the fair market
value of the property transferred, i.e., the interest foregone. The
employer-lender should be taxed accordingly.
110 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See text at notes 75-80 supra.
'" See text at notes 75-80 supra.
"2 See text at notes 81-84 supra.
"3 E.g.. Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968); United States v.
General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); International
Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
12 Id. at 994-95.
t" Id, at 994.
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C. Is The Employer-Lender Entitled to a Businesss Expense Deduction for
Compensation Paid?
Once it is determined that an employer realizes income on the is-
suance of an interest-free loan to an employee, then it follows logically that
what the employer received as income, it also paid to the employee as com-
pensation. The necessity for this symmetrical result is made clear in
analogous cases involving the compensatory transfer of appreciated prop-
erty"' and of the rent-free use of property" 8 to an employee. Where it has
been determined that the in-kind transfer resulted in realized income to
the employer, it has consistently been held that the income so received was
also paid out to the employee as additional compensation." It is only
where the courts have determined that an in-kind transfer resulted in no
realized gain to the employer-transferor that they have refused to provide
such employer with a fair value business deduction. 12° Since it has already
been determined that the interest-free loan produces income to the
employer-lender, it follows that a deduction for compensation paid will also
be available.' 21
LIT See cases cited in note 113 supra.
"" See, e.g., Reynard Corp,, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934), and 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938); K.C.
Bellows, 26 T:C.M. (CCH) 978 (1967).
"' E.g., 7'asty Baking, 393 F.2d at 994-95; General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d at 12-13; In-
ternational Freighting, 135 F.2d at 313.
120 For example, the 1941 case of International Freighting Corporation v. Commis-
sioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943) involved the tax consequences of an employer's transfer of
bonuses to its employees, in the form of appreciated stock. The case raised the dual questions.
first whether the employer realized taxable gain in the amount of the difference between the
cost and fair market value of such stock, and second, whether the amount deductible by it was
the basis or the fair market value of the stock at the time of the distribution. The I.R.S.
seemed to demand nothing more than symmetry of tax consequences. Either the employer re-
alized gain and received a fair market value deduction, or did not realize gain and received
only a basis deduction. Id, at 312. The Second Circuit held that the correct result for the em-
ployer was realization of gain and a fair market value deduction, a result that is beyond dis-
pute today. See cases cited in note 113 supra.
Symmetry was also achieved in Reynard Corporation, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934) and 57
B.T.A. 552 (1938), but there it was the illogical no-income, no-deduction symmetry. In that
case, it will be recalled, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the rental value of premises, pro-
vided rent-free by the employer to its employee, did not result in gross income to the corpora-
tion, Nevertheless, the Court, in the first Reynard case, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934), seemed to as-
sume that a deduction for compensation paid, equal to the fair rental value of the premises
transferred, could have been allowed the employer, even though it was not required to rec-
ognize the constructive rental income. Id. at 454. In fact, the court permitted no such deduc-
tion in the case because there was no proof that the total compensation paid, taking into ac-
count the fair rental value of the property transferred, was reasonable. Id. The tax law per-
mits a business expense deduction for compensation paid only when the compensation was
reasonable. 1.R.C. 162(a)( I). In the second Reynard case, 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938), however,
which involved a later year of the same taxpayer, the Board of Tax Appeals clarified its posi-
tion on the employer's right to a deduction. The court held that so long as the corporation
was not deemed to have realized the fair rental value as income, there was no basis upon
which it could claim a deduction for the compensation paid, whether or not the total compen-
sation was reasonable. Id. at 560. See also K.C. Bellows, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 978 (1967).
"'This result assumes that the compensation paid is reasonable in amount. Unreason-
able compensation is not deductible. I.R.C. 162(a).
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D. The Inadequacy of the No-Income, No-Deduction Approach
It has been concluded in the previous section that because the
employer-lender realizes constructive interest income on an interest-free
loan to its employee, it follows that the employer must have paid the same
amount as compensation for services. Yet, if this is so, the initial
question—whether or not the employer-lender has constructive interest
income—appears academic, since, if it does have that income, the income
will be offset by an equal deduction. Thus, one might conclude that the
no-income, no-deduction approach and the two-payment transaction
analysis produce identical results. However, as in the case of the taxation of
shareholders and employee recipients of interest-free loans,' 22 that conclu-
sion is deceptive for a number of reasons. First, the income and deduction,
though equal in amount, may be reportable by the employer in different
years. This possibility is examined fully in Part III of this article. Second,
even though offset by an equivalent deduction, the existence of the gross
income interest item may itself have important tax consequences. For
example, an increase in interest income may cause problems of qualifica-
tion for a Subchapter S corporation 123 or could generate personal holding
company problems for corporate employers.' 24 Third, the offsetting deduc-
tion in fact will not always be available to the employer-lender. This result
would obtain, for example, where the total compensation paid, taking into
account the economic value of the interest-free loan transferred, is deemed
unreasonable, since unreasonable compensation is not deductible.' 25
That an offsetting deduction will not arise in all cases was recognized
by Professor Sneed. Yet he rejected the two-payment approach because he
feared that even if the employer-lender were deemed to realize income
when it made an interest-free loan, it would never be entitled to an offset-
122 Sec text at notes 24-35 supra.
123 1.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(A) states that a Subchapter S election terminates in any year in
which a corporation "has gross receipts more than 20 percent of which is passive investment
income." I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C) defines passive investment income to include "gross receipts
derived from ... interest." See B. BEETKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 9 6.03.
'" I.R.C. § 542(a)(I) defines a "personal holding company" as any corporation if "at
least 60 percent of its adjusted gross income .. is personal holding company income." I.R.C.
§ 543(a)(1) states that personal holding company income includes "interest." See B. BITIKER &
J. EUNEICE, supra note 3, at 1 8.22.
Another example of consequences attending the existence of a gross income item is
found in I.R.C. § 6501(e). Under that section an omission of an item of gross income which is
in excess of 25% of the amount of gross income stated in the return will lead to an extension
of the statute of limitations from three to six years.
1 " I.R.C. § 162(a).
Excessive compensation can be disallowed (1) because if paid to officer-
stockholders or employee-stockholders it is really a guise for the distribution of
profits to stockholders and not an operating expense of the business enterprise;
(2) because it represents a gift by the owners of' the enterprise and lacks the re-
quisite connection with business operations; and (3) perhaps because, though
neither a distribution of profits nor a gift, it is unreasonable in amount.
I S. SURREY. W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 55, at 320. In the first Reynard
case, the Board of Tax Appeals disallowed a deduction for the compensation paid because of
the third reason stated above. 30 B.T.A. at 454.
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ting business deduction, under section 162, for an amount not literally
"paid or incurred."'" Therefore, Professor Sneed proposed a modification
of the no-income, no-deduction approach which would produce a rational
result even where a deduction would not normally be available. The test is
similar to the one he suggested in connection with the taxation of the
shareholder or employee-borrower:
Is the interest-free loan such that had it been at interest the lender would
have been entitled to deduct the interest so earned had he paid it over to
the borrower? If the answer is affirmative, an exclusion [of the in-
come] is justified, otherwise it is not. 12 '
Professor Sneed again appears to be rejecting a logical statutory con-
struction (i.e., income to the employer-lender, and an offsetting deduction
in the same amount, if otherwise available) for a much less justifiable con-
struction: income to the lender only if the lender would not have been enti-
tled to a deduction had it actually paid a cash amount to the borrower.
While his test does account for the situation where, under the two-payment
analysis, income would be recognized but a deduction denied, it fails to
remedy the other defects identified in the no-income, no-deduction ap-
proach. Professor Sneed's test ignores the timing consideration discussed in
Part III, and also reaches the wrong result where the Code makes the de-
termination of "gross" income independently significant.'"
Moreover, the problem which Professor Sneed's approach seeks to
avoid—the unavailability of a deduction for an amount not literally paid or
incurred—is, as previously demonstrated, quite illusory.'" Amounts "paid
or incurred" can easily be interpreted to include constructive payments,' 3°
permitting deduction of the foregone interest amounts. Thus Professor
Sneed's modified no-income, no-deduction approach retains several of the
flaws of the original version, and does not respond to any compulsion of
Code interpretation. Since both Professor Sneed's suggestion and the pure
no-income, no-deduction approach produce illogical results in certain in-
stances, the two-payment analysis . is highly preferable.
The two-payment analysis produces the results previously described.
The employee should be deemed to receive compensation in the amount of
the foregone interest and should be entitled to a deduction under section
163 for the interest constructively paid. The employer should be deemed to
recognize income in the amount of the constructive interest payment and a
business expense deduction for the compensation paid to the employee—
the value of the interest-free loan—provided that that compensation is
reasonable in amount.
I " Sneed, supra note 4, at 661.
" 7 Id. (emphasis in original). Sneed's test would result, of course, in always taxing a
corporation that transferred an interest-free loan as a dividend. This is the same result called
for in Part 1, supra.
12 " See text at notes 123-24 supra.
1 " See text at notes 53-70 supra.
10 See text at notes 53-70 supra.
253
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
III. VALUATION AND TIMING QUESTIONS
A. Valuation Problems
In Parts I and II it was concluded that both the transferor and the
transferee of an interest-free loan should realize income—and often be en-
titled to an offsetting deduction—in an amount equal to the interest charge
that would have been made had the loan been at arm's length. The method
for computation of that arm's length interest charge must now be de-
termined.' 31
The rate of interest that would represent full and adequate considera-
tion in any given interest-free loan transaction could vary widely depending
upon the actual circumstances of the case. To determine the most accurate
interest rate in each case, the Service would have to investigate first the
value of the security given, if any, and second the borrower's credit rating.
It would then have to determine the interest rate an arm's length lender in
the community would charge to a like borrower. Such a detailed investiga-
tion of the complex circumstances of each loan would strain the Service's
capabilities. Nor is this the only difficulty that the Internal Revenue Service
would face in this valuation process. As one author notes:
[W]hat role state usury laws should play in valuing the discount
using arm's-length standards is uncertain. If the normal interest
rate for an unsecured loan is eighteen percent per annum, may
the gift be measured by that rate even though the maximum
legal rate of interest to the individual under state law is twelve
151
 In the decided gift and income tax cases and rulings, the I.R.S. generally has im-
puted interest using either the prime rate or the rates set forth in the regulations governing
the valuation of life estates, term interests, remainders, and reversions. For example, in Dean,
the Service used the prime rate to measure the income to the stockholders. 35 T.C. at 1087.
The Commissioner originally charged the taxpayers with income equal to interest computed at
the legal rate in Delaware (6%), but on brief reduced the income to the lower prime rate
(which varied between 3% and 4%) since it was stipulated that the taxpayers could have bor-
rowed the funds at the lower rate. Id. The approximate prime rate of interest was also used by
the government to value the gift of an interest-free loan in the recent Tax Court case of Les-
ter Crown, 67 T.C. 1060, 1061 (1977). In that case the Tax Court held that the donative
transfer of a non-interest bearing loan does not result in a taxable gift, id. at 1064-65, and
hence did not need to reach the valuation question. In Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp.
73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), also a gift tax case, the government unsuccessfully argued that an
interest-free loan was a gift which could be valued at 31/2% interest per annum. Id. at 73. The
31/2% rate may have been borrowed from the regulations then governing the valuation of
life-estates, term interests, remainders and reversions. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1956), as
amended, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367. As in Crown, however, the district court in Johnson held
that there was no taxable gift, and thus never reached the valuation issue. In Rev. Rul. 73-61,
1973-1 C.B. 408, also a gift tax ruling, the Service stated that it would not follow Johnson but
instead would find a gift of the value of the use of the money loaned in cases of interest-free
loans from taxpayers to their children. The Service found that the value in such a case is
"Wile rate of interest that would represent full and adequate consideration" for the use of
the money. This value "may vary," the Service observed "depending upon the actual circum-
stances pertaining to the transaction." 1973-1 C.B. at 409. But the Service went on to cite the
regulations governing the valuation of term and contingent interests in property. Treas. Reg.
25.2512-5. It is, therefore, unclear whether the Service intended the amount of the gift in the
ruling to be determined by reference to the market rate of interest, or by application of the
regulations table then in effect.
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percent? What interest rate should be imputed to the loan if an
arm's-length lender would not make an unsecured loan to the
borrower under any circumstances? It may be one thing to
measure the value of the [transfer] by reference to the standard
of the shylock, but quite another to use the rate of the loan
sharks.' 32
Clearly, therefore, an individualized approach to the valuation of construc-
tive interest is beset with too many difficulties to be feasible.
The most appealing alternative to the individualized approach is
found in the Regulations under sections 482' 33 and 483) 34 These sections
permit the Secretary, under certain circumstances, to reallocate income and
deductions among businesses controlled by the same parties and to treat as
interest a portion of deferred payments on sales where no interest is stated
in the sales contract. The regulations under both those sections provide, as
a general rule, that an interest rate of seven percent will be imputed in a
non-arm's length loan or in an installment sale transaction, unless certain
safe haven interest rates are provided for in the contract) 35 If the courts
reject the no-income, no-deduction approach and instead treat interest-free
loans in conformity with their economically equivalent two-payment trans-
actions, it would seem appropriate for the Internal Revenue Service, by
regulation, to make these specified rates also govern the computation of in-
come and deduction in the case of all interest-free loans whether or not
governed by section 482 or 483. Because the specified rates do not take
into account all the factors that, in any given case, would influence the in-
terest rate, the result achieved by the recommended approach will not
always mirror that produced by the equivalent two-payment transaction.
Applying the interest rates specified in the regulations under sections 482
and 483 will, however, closely approximate the two-payment result white
avoiding the procedural complexities of an individualized approach.
132 O'Hare, supra note 40, at 1090. In discussing the proper valuation of interest-free
loans for gift tax purposes, O'Hare suggests as an alternative to market valuation, the possibil-
ity of using the "income actually produced by the loan" as a means of determining the amount
of the gift. Id. This valuation technique seems appropriate, however, only if the transferor has
kept such control over the use of the funds that the transfer can be considered a sham and
the income actually produced by the borrowed funds can be attributed to the lender. Other-
wise, there would seem to be no precedent or logic for such an approach.
135
 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) generally provides the following rules for advances by one
member of a controlled group to another: (1) On loans or advances entered into on or after
July 24, 1975, no allocations of income and deduction will be made by the Commissioner if
the annual interest charge is at least 6% but not more than 8%. Moreover, if an arm's length
rate, based on the facts, is more than 8% or less than 6%, the arm's length rate may be
applied. These rules apply only if the creditor is not regularly engaged in the business of mak-
ing loans. if it is so engaged, an arm's length interest rate will be used in all cases by the
Commissioner to allocate income and deductions: (2) If the rate actually charged is not an
arm's length or safe haven rate, the Commissioner may establish an allocation reflecting an
annual rate of 7% simple interest.
134
 Treas. Reg. § 1.483-I(c)(2)(ii)(B) provides that for payments on account of a sale or
exchange of property entered into on or after July 24, 1975, the imputed interest rate shall be
7% per annum compounded semiannually. No interest will be imputed, however, if the con-
tract provides for not less than 6% per annum simple interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-
I (d)( )(ii)(B).
15
 See notes 133-34 supra.
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B. Timing Problems
Since the constructive interest amount is never actually received or
paid, interest-free loans give rise to problems regarding the timing of in-
come and deductions. In considering these problems, the distinction be-
tween loans that are payable on demand and loans with a fixed repayment
date must be noted. The demand loan is relatively simple and will be
briefly discussed. The loan with a fixed repayment date will be given a
more extensive analysis. In the latter discussion the transfer from employer
to employee will be considered separately from the transfer from corpora-
tion to shareholder.
1. Demand Loans
If the interest-free loan from a corporation to a shareholder or from
an employer to an employee is a demand loan, no substantial problems will
arise in determining the correct time at which the various parties should
report their income and deductions. Consider the following example:
On January 1, 1978, employer makes an interest-free demand
loan of $1,000 to employee. The principal is repaid by employee
to employer on December 31, 1978.
Assuming that a reasonable interest rate would have been seven percent, a
calendar year employer, whether a cash or accrual basis taxpayer, should
realize $70 of interest income in 1978, and normally would be entitled in
that year to an offsetting business expense deduction,' 3° in an equal
amount. Likewise, the employee, whether a cash or accrual basis taxpayer,
should realize $70 of income in 1978, and normally would be entitled to an
offsetting interest deduction in the same year.'"
Minor timing complications arise, however, for a cash basis employer
and employee, if that demand loan is not repaid by the employee in the
same year in which the loan was granted. In that case certain assumptions
would have to be made as to when the constructive interest was paid. This
is so since a cash basis taxpayer reports income and deductions only when
received and paid,'" and in the interest-free loan situation no interest
payments are ever actually made. This problem, however, can be resolved
easily by presuming that constructive cash interest payments are made at
least once a year. In effect, the demand loan transaction will be treated as a
series of indepedent one year seven percent loans. In the example above,
assuming the employee repaid the demand loan on December 31, 1980, in-
stead of on December 31, 1978, the result would be a $70 income and de-
duction item for both the employer and employee in 1978, 1979 and 1980.
If the same demand loan is repaid by a shareholder-borrower to a
corporation-lender, rather than by an employee to an employer, the corpo-
rate lender would still have $70 of interest income in each of the three
years the loan was outstanding. However, the corporation would lack the
' 36 If the total compensation paid is unreasonable, the employer would not be entitled
to the deduction. See note 125 supra.
1.R.C. § 163. For exceptions, see text at notes 33.35 supra.
136
	 Reg. §§ 1.951-1 (1960); 1.461-1(a)(1) (1960).
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benefit of any offsetting deduction since dividend payments, unlike com-
pensation payments, are not deductible.
The timing problem in the demand loan situation thus is easily re-
solved. If the demand loan is repaid in the year in which made, the con-
structive interest income and deduction should be attributed to that year. If
the loan is not repaid within that year, annual constructive interest pay-
ments can be presumed and the income and deduction can be timed ac-
cordingly.
2. Loans with Fixed Repayment Dates
When the timing questions involved when a corporation or an em-
ployer transfers an interest-free loan with a fixed repayment date are con-
sidered, the problems multiply. The employer-employee transfer will be
examined first.
a. Transfers by Employer to Employee '
It is helpful to begin the discussion with the following hypothetical in-
volving a fixed term interest-free loan from an employer to an employee.
Employer lends employee $10,000 in exchange for the
employee's $10,000 promissory note payable in ten years and
bearing no interest. Assuming a fair annual interest rate on the
loan would be seven percent, the present discounted value of the
promissory note transferred to the employer by the employee is
approximately $5,000.' 39
The transaction that actually occurred is economically identical to a
transaction in which an employer transfers $5,000 cash compensation out-
right to an employee, white at the same time making a $5,000 discount loan
to that employee in exchange for the employee's promise to repay $10,000
in ten years. In a discount loan the lender discounts to present value the
face amount of the debtor's note and transfers the discounted value in ex-
. change for the note. The subsequent payment of the note may be viewed
as payment of principal (the discounted value transferred) plus interest (the
difference between the face amount of the note and the discounted
value).' 40
 Since this analysis reflects the economic realities of the fixed term
interest-free loan transaction, it also should determine its actual tax conse-
quences. In analyzing those consequences, the timing of the employee's in-
come and interest deduction will be considered first. Then the compensa-
tion deduction and income of the employer will be discussed.
In
 To compute this figure, apply Table 1V, Treas. Reg. 	 1.483-1(g)(2) (1966), which
computes the present value of $1 at 7%, compounded semiannually.
''° Thus, in our example, the principal of the loan is seen to be $5,000. Repayment in
year ten therelbre consists of $5,000 of principal and $5,000 of interest. An alternative
analysis views the principal of the loan as $10,000, from which $5,000 of interest is deducted
before the loan money is transferred to the borrower. Repayment in year 10 would then con-
sist of $10,000 of principal. See note 160 infra.
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i. The Employee's Tax Consequences
(A) Timing of Inclusion of Employee's Income
The employee should realize immediate compensation income equal
to the $5,000 economic benefit received. The employee has received
$10,000 cash from his employer and has given in exchange a note with a
present value of only $5,000. The employee can use the $5,000 excess cash
value received to satisfy his own immediate personal needs while insuring
that the funds will be available to repay the $10,000 ten years hence by re-
lending the remaining $5,000 to a third party on equivalent terms, i.e., by
making a discount loan of $5,000 requiring the repayment of $10,000 in
ten years. The fact that the employee eventually will pay the full $10,000
face amount of the note in accordance with its terms in no way diminishes
the amount of the compensation he receives in year one.' 4 '
The $5,000 excess value is the measure of the economic value of the
interest-free use of money and corresponds to the constructive interest in
the demand loan example. Taxing the employee on the $5,000 excess value
received in year one is consistent with the position taken by the Internal
Revenue Service in a situation involving the gift tax treatment of interest-
free loans. In Revenue Ruling 73-61, 142 the Service held that a donative
transfer of $50,000 in exchange for a note of the donee in the same
amount payable in ten years, with no interest, resulted in an immediate
gift, within the purview of section 2501 of the. Code, in an amount equal to
the difference between the $50,000 cash transferred and the present dis-
counted value of the non-interest bearing note received. This same rule for
valuation should be applied in the case of interest-free loans between em-
ployers and employees with the result that the employee should recognize
income at the time the loan is made in the amount of the difference be-
tween the cash received and the present value of the debt obligation.
Applying this rule to the example, the employee who received the
$10,000 interest-free term loan would be required to report $5,000 of
compensation income in year one. This result is consistent not only with
Revenue Ruling 73-61 but also with the result reached recently by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Masan v. United States." 3 In that case, a
taxpayer sold property to a charity for a stated price equal to the fair mar-
ket value of the property.'" The charity paid the stated price by delivering
a small amount of cash and an unsecured long-term promissory note in the
amount of the balance.' 45 The present value of the note was substantially
-
lower than the note's face value, due in large part to the fact that the four
percent interest rate on the loan was less than the fair market rate of in-
terest.' 46 The court held that the taxpayer had made a deductible gift to
141 Th is point was specifically made on somewhat different facts by the Seventh Circuit.
Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25, 29 (7th Cir. 1975). See text at notes 143-47 infra, where
the facts of Mason are discussed.
12 1973-1 C.B. 408.
"$ 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
'" Id, at 26.
' 45 1d.
'" Id. at 26-27.
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the charity, in the year of the transfer, in an amount equal to the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the property transferred and the
fair market value of the cash and note received."'
A similar analysis was rejected, however, by the Tax Court in the re-
cent case of Lester Crown."' The majority in that case concluded that a
donative transfer of an interest-free loan does not result in a taxable gift." 9
The dissent in Lester Crown embraced the Service's reasoning that the trans-
fer of an interest-free loan is a gift if full and adequate consideration is not
received in exchange therefore."° Judge Simpson, writing for the dis-
senters,' 5 ' observed that the Service's approach had been applied in several
cases. 152 One of these, Gertrude H. Blackburn, 153 involved a part gift part
sale transaction. The petitioner transferred property to her children in re-
turn for a note which had a face amount significantly below the fair market
value of the property, and which bore interest at a rate significantly below
the usual rate.'" The petitioner argued that the amount of the gift was
measured by the difference between the value of the property and the face
amount of the note.' 55 The Tax Court disagreed, observing that the note
was not worth its face value. According to the court, the proper measure
for the taxable gift portion of the transfer was the difference between the
fair market value of the property and the discounted value of the note, To
reach the present value of the note, the court discounted the face amount
by the difference between the going rate of interest and that provided for
in the note.'" Dissenting in .
 Lester Crown, Judge Simpson observed that the
same rule applies where the interest amount provided for in the note is
zero.'" He concluded that the majority had improperly disregarded the
holdings in Blackburn and other recent cases.'"
Applying the gift tax approach taken by the Service in Revenue Rul-
ing 73-61, by the Seventh Circuit in Mason v. United States and by the dis-
sent in Lester Crown, to the case of the interest-free loan from employer to
employee, it is found, as previously demonstrated, that the employee
should recognize immediate compensation income in the amount of the
difference between the cash received and the present value of the debt ob-
ligation.
"I Id. at 29. See Duhl & Fine, supra note 2, at 34, 36.
148 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
Id. at 1064.
'" Id. at 1068, (Simpson J., dissenting). See Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
"' Judge Simpson was joined in dissent by Judges Raum, Tannenwald, and Wilbur.
'" The cases cited by Judge Simpson were Gertrude H. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204 (1953);
Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948); Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C. 543 (1943).
'"20 T.C. 204 (1953).
'" Id. at 205.
'" Id. at 204.
"Id. at 207.
'" 67 T.C. at 1068.
158
 Judge Simpson wrote that
lt]he same approach has been applied in those cases involving members of a fam-
ily exchanging property for an annuity. See Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C.
1073 (1948); Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C. 543 (1943). In such cases, it was
held that the present value of the annuity was to be computed and that if the
value of the property exceeded the present value of the annuity, there was a tax-
able gift. The conclusion of the Court in this case has ignored the holdings in
Blackburn, Bartman and Bergan.
Id. at 1068.69 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
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(B) Timing of Employee's Deduction
Once the logical conclusion that the employee in the above hypotheti-
cal realizes $5,000 compensation income in one year is accepted, then the
next question to be answered is when, if at all, the employee will be able to
take a deduction for interest paid. It is clear that the employee should not
be entitled to deduct the $5,000 difference between the $10,000 principal
amount of the discount loan and the $5,000 actually received as "interest
paid" in the year of borrowing.'" Assuming that the employee is a cash
basis taxpayer, he will be entitled, under a discount loan approach, to de-
duct the interest only in the year he pays it, and that will be in year ten in
the hypothetical.'" If he is an accrual taxpayer, he will have to deduct rat-
ably the $5,000 interest discount over the ten year period of the loan."'
Thus, although the employee who receives an interest-free term loan,
whose economic benefit he takes into income, will normally be entitled to
an interest deduction equal to that economic benefit, the compensation in-
come and the interest deduction will be in different years. This is another,
and a most significant, factor ignored by those who favor the no-income,
no-deduction treatment of interest-free loans.
16 '~ See, e.g., John C. Cleaver, 6 T.C. 452, 454-55, affd, 158 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 849 (1947); Rev. Rul. 73-482, 1973-2 C.B. 44.
1" An alternative way of analyzing the facts in the hypothetical would change the tim-
ing of the employee's deduction. It might be said that the hypothetical facts have the same
economic effect as a transaction by which an employer transfers both a $10,000 loan and an
additional $5,000 cash to an employee. The $5,000 cash is compensation for services. Im-
mediately upon receipt, the employee repays this $5,000 to the employer as prepaid interest
on the $10,000 loan. In that case the cash basis employee could be considered to have prepaid
the interest in year one, See, e.g., G. Douglas 13urck, 63 T.C. 556, 560 (1975) affd 533 F.2d
768 (1976); Newton A. Burgess, 8 T.C. 47, 50 (1947). These cases indicate that where the
lender actually transfers an amount that includes the interest payment to the borrower who
commingles this amount with his other funds and shortly thereafter makes the interest pay-
ment to the lender, the borrower is deemed to have paid the interest at the outset. Neverthe-
less, the employee would still not be able to deduct the entire $5,000 in year one. Rather, he
would, under newly enacted I.R.C. 46I(g), have to deduct the $5,000 prepaid interest rata-
bly over the ten year period of the loan. In the simple discount loan case, where a creditor
withholds a sum from the face amount of the loan as interest, and transfers only the re-
mainder, there is no payment of interest until actual repayment of the loan. John Randolph
Hopkins, 15 T.C. 160, 180-82 (1950). See also Edward L. Smallwood, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1615
(1977) (cash basis taxpayer cannot deduct interest paid in year of execution of promissory
note for interest liability; normal discount loan rules apply); Burton Foster, 32 T.C.M. (CCH)
243 (1973) (loan fee discounted from transfer of loan principal is not deductible by cash basis
borrower until loan is repaid); Rev. Rul. 75-12, 1975-I C.B. 62 (discount amount deductible
by cash basis borrower only when loan is repaid; by accrual basis borrower as the interest ac-
crues).
Thus the courts, in finding a prepaid interest loan only in those cases where the bor-
rower has received an amount equal to principal plus interest and commingled this amount
with his other funds, has made the identification of a prepaid interest loan contingent upon
the form of the transaction. Because the form of the transaction discussed in the text does not
correspond to that required for a finding of prepaid interest, the prepaid interest analysis was
not applied.
"'See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957).
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ii. The Employer's Tax Consequences
(A) Timing of the Employer's Deduction
In the above hypothetical the employer should be entitled to a $5,000
business expense deduction in year one for the compensation paid, assum-
ing that the compensation is reasonable in amount. This, of course, is the
only result consistent with taxing the employee on $5,000 of compensation
income in year one. Moreover that deduction result comports with eco-
nomic reality, since the employer has parted irrevocably in year one with
$5,000 cash. It has transferred $10,000 cash in exchange for a promissory
note which it now can discount for no more than $5,000. The fact that the
full $10,000 face value of the note eventually will be paid to the employer
does not alter in any way the fact that it has made a $5,000 compensation
transfer to the employee in year one." 2 Because the employer has paid
$5,000 compensation in year one, it is entitled to a business expense deduc-
tion at that time.
(B) Timing of the Employer's Income Inclusion
As has been shown, in the above hypothetical, the employer is entitled
to a year one, $5,000 business deduction. However, if the discount loan is
seen as involving the transfer of $5,000 of principal in year one in return
for a repayment in year ten of the $5,000 of principal plus $5,000 of in-
terest, the employer should not realize the $5,000 loan discount as interest
income in year one.'" Rather, the employer should accrue the $5,000 of
interest income over the ten year term of the note if it is an accrual basis
taxpayer,'" or should report all the interest income in year ten when it re-
ceives payment of the note if it is a cash basis taxpayer.'" Therefore, to
suggest, as have several judges and commentators,'" that it normally is ir-
relevant to the employer making an interest-free loan whether it has in-
come and an offsetting deduction, or no income and no deduction, is in-
correct. For when the interest-free loan has a fixed repayment date, the
employer's deduction will be in year one, while, under the proposed
analysis, the income will not be reportable until a later year or years.'"
' 82 Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25, 29 (7th Cir. 1975).
1 " See, e.g., Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 1 B.T.A. 460 (1925). However this result
would be different if the hypothetical were analyzed as a prepaid interest transaction, see note
160 supra, rather than as a discount loan transaction. If the corporation is considered to have
received $5,000 prepaid interest in year one, it would be required to report the entire $5,000
in that year whether it were a cash or accrual basis taxpayer. See Jack A. Mele, 61 T.C. 358,
364-66 (1973).
164 See Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 1 B.T.A. 460 (1925); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a)
(1957). The result would be different if the hypothetical facts were analyzed as a prepaid in-
terest situation, See note 160 supra.
165 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1957).
K.C. Bellows, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 978, 980 (1967); Sneed, supra note 4, at 655,
661.
' 61 This deferral of income recognition favors the taxpayer. The benefit of the business
expense deduction is received in year one. The tax savings from year one can be invested
pending the recognition and taxation of the interest income.
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b. Transfer by Corporation to Shareholder
If the fixed term interest-free loan hypothesized in the previous sec-
tion were from a corporation to a shareholder, rather than from an em-
ployer to an employee, the analysis of tax consequences would not change.
The shareholder would recognize $5,000 of dividend income in year one,
assuming that the corporation has adequate earnings and profits. If the
shareholder is a cash basis taxpayer, the $5,000 constructive interest pay-
ment will be deductible in year ten. If he is an accrual basis taxpayer, the
$5,000 will be deducted ratably over the ten year period of the loan." The
corporate lender will report the interest income in year ten if it is a cash
basis taxpayer. If it is an accrual basis taxpayer, it will accrue the $5,000 of
interest income over the ten year period of the note. There is, however,
one difference between the tax consequences of the employer-employee
loan and those of the corporation-shareholder loan. In the latter case, the
corporation-lender would not be entitled to a deduction for the $5,000 cash
dividend it effectively paid in year one, since dividends, unlike compensa-
tion payments, are not deductible.
As has been shown, the valuation and timing problems are not in-
surmountable. Appropriate valuation and timing of constructive interest
payments can be achieved by applying the preceding analysis. Because in
most cases the income and deduction are properly recognized in different
years, the no-income, no-deduction approach, which presumes that the in-
come and deduction will occur in the same year and so nullify one another,
is inadequate.
IV. THE USE OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS TO ACCOMPLISH A BARGAIN SALE
OF PROPERTY: THE OVERLAP WITH SECTION 483
Corporations and employers can use interest-free loans in tandem
with sales of property to provide benefits to their shareholders or
employees. For example, a corporation or employer might sell property to
its shareholder or employee in exchange for the latter's non-interest
bearing fixed term promissory note in a face amount equal to the present
fair market value of the property transferred. This type of transaction can
be viewed in two distinct ways: first, it can be seen as a sale of property by
the corporation or employer for full value combined with the simultaneous
transfer to its shareholder or employee of a fixed term interest-free loan in
the amount necessary to pay the purchase price of the property; second, it
can be viewed in the way the parties actually structured it, as a single sales
transaction at a bargain price.
If the transaction were deemed to result in a separate, fixed term
interest-free loan to the employee or shareholder, unrelated to the sale of
property, current law would, as previously demonstrated, provide neither
income nor deduction consequences to any of the parties on the loan part
of the transaction. If viewed, however, as a single sales transaction—which
1" See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957).
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is the way the Treasury Regulations apparently would view the
transactionm—under current law a reasonable interest amount would be
imputed, producing interest income to the lender and an interest
deduction to the borrower."° This result is provided by section 483 of the
Code, which authorizes the Commissioner to treat a reasonable portion of
deferred payments on the sale of property as constructive interest rather
than as part of the purchase price, in the absence of a contract provision
for adequate interest payments. In combination with other provisions of
current law,'" section 483 produces the rational results of the
recommended two-payment analysis in certain cases of bargain sales of
property in exchange for interest-free promissory notes.
The normal operation of section 483 in an arm's length sales
transaction now will be examined. The section's application to the bargain
sale transaction described above will then be considered.
A. Section 483 –Its Usual Application
Section 483 provides for the imputing of interest in cases of deferred
payment sales or exchanges of property where no interest, or inadequate
interest, has been specified. The situation that was contemplated by the
drafters of section 483 was one in which there was an arm's length
installment sale of property between an unrelated buyer and seller, which
failed to call specifically for any interest on the deferred payments, or
which called for an interest rate on those payments that was too low."'
Section 483 provides a method for determining what portion of the
apparent sale price actually constitutes interest. The total unstated interest
is identified as the excess of the sum of the payments to be made over the
sum of the present value of such payments and of the stated interest
payments, if .any." 3 The regulations provide tables for computing the
present value of the promised payments. The interest rate used in
computing present value is currently seven percent. 14 A portion of the
total unstated interest is allocated to each payment.' 75
As an example of the operation of section 483 in the usual arm's
length transfer situation, consider the case of stock sold by a seller to an
unrelated buyer for $20,000, payable $10,000 in year five and $10,000 in
year ten. In this example, it is obvious that the real economics of the deal
are different from those set forth in the agreement. It is clear that the
actual present fair market value of the property sold is less than $20,000,
since the total $20,000 figure the buyer is to pay over time represents not
' 53 See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(6), Ex, 6 (1966). The example indicates that the transac-
tion would be viewed as a single sales transaction even if the parties structured it as an
interest-free loan and a separate sale of property. Id.
"° I.R.C. § 483.
"I E.g., 1.R.C. § 83, which requires that an employee recognize income on the receipt
of property in exchange for services; I.R.C, § 162(a)(1) which permits the employer a deduc-
tion for reasonable compensation; and I.R.C. gg 301, 316 which provide for a shareholder's
recognition of dividend income.
I" H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 101-02 (1964).
"3 1.R.C. § 483(6).
' 74
 Treas. Reg. § 1,483.1(c)(2)(ii)(B) (1966).
175 I.R.C. § 483(a).
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only the purchase price for the stock, but also unstated interest on the
deferred payments. Under section 483 the present value of the two
payments of $10,000 can be computed by discounting the promised
payments at seven percent compounded semiannually, in accordance with
the current regulations.' 76
 The resulting figure is approximately
$12,000.' The difference between the amount owed, $20,000, and the
present value of that obligation, $12,000, provides a figure of $8,000 for
unstated interest. This imputed interest will be allocated pro rata to each
stated principal payment due more than six months after the date of
sale. 18
 Therefore, part of the purchase price will be deductible interest to
the buyer and ordinary interest income to the seller. In the example given
above, of each $10,000 payment, $4,000 would be considered a payment of
interest. "B
The drafters of section 483 apparently never considered the proper
tax treatment of a sales transaction in which the buyer and seller were not
bargaining at arm's length.' 8° That is, they did not consider a transaction in
which the seller intended to grant the buyer an economic benefit by not
charging interest on the deferred payments. An example of such a non-
arm's length transaction would be the sale of property by a corporation or
employer in exchange for the latter's non-interest bearing fixed term
promissory note in a face amount equal to the present fair market value of
the property transferred. While Code section 483 may not have been
specifically designed to cover this non-arm's length situation, it seems that
the section would apply to the deferred payments that the employee or
shareholder makes to the employer or corporation.' 8 ' The situation of an
employer transferring property to an employee will be considered first.
1. Sale of Property By Employer To Employee In Exchange For Note
Bearing No Interest
The following hypothetical is illustrative of the transaction now under
discussion:
"6
 Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(d)(1)(ii)(B) (1966) (test rate or minimum interest that must be
stated to escape imputation of interest under 1.R.C. § 483 is six percent in the case of sales or
exchanges after July 24, 1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(c)(2)(ii)(B) (1966) (imputing rate is seven
percent in the case of sales or exchanges after July 24, 1975).
1" See Table IV of Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(g)(2) (1966).
"" I.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. § I.483-1(a)(1) (1966).
I.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(a)(1) (1966).
"" See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 101-02 (1964).
"' The language of I.R.C. § 483 is broad. Section 483(a) provides that
Mor purposes of this title, in the case of any contract for the sale or ex-
change of property there shall be treated as interest that part of a payment to
which this section applies which bears the same ratio to the amount of such pay-
ment as the total unstated interest under such contract bears to the total of the
payments to which this section applies which are due under such contract.
The payments to which the section applies are payments toward the sales price which are due
more than six months after the date of such sale or exchange under a contract under which at
least some of the payments are due more than one year after the date of such sale or ex-
change, and under which there is total unstated interest. I.R.C. § 483(c)(1). Nothing in § 483
excludes the case of a bargain sale of property in exchange for a deferred payment, non-
interest bearing note.
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An employer owns stock with a basis of $5,000 and a fair market
value of $20,000. The employer sells this stock to its employee in
exchange for a promissory note under which the employee
agrees to pay the employer, without interest, $10,000 at the end
of year five and an additional $10,000 at the end of year ten.
If a fair interest rate of seven percent, as provided in the section 483
regulations, is assumed, then the present discounted value of the notes
given by the employee to the employer in the hypothetical is approximately
$12,000.' 82 Therefore, the true economics of the situation are these: the
employer has effectuated a bargain sale of stock worth $20,000 to the
employee for $12,000. The employee has paid the $12,000 bargain pur-
chase price with non-interest bearing promissory notes payable after five
and ten years in the face amount of $20,000 but with a present discounted
value of $12,000. Thus, this bargain sale, Iike any bargain sale, can be bro-
ken down into its two elements, a transfer of $8,000 of property in ex-
change for services, and a sale of $12,000 of property in exchange for a
non-interest bearing note with a present value of $12,000. If' this correctly
describes the economics of the transaction, it should also determine the tax
consequences for both the employer and the employee.
a. Employee's Tax Consequences
Two questions are presented by the employee's tax situation—the
timing of the interest deduction and the realization of compensation
income. As to the former, section 483 gives the answer.'" Under that
section the unstated interest on the employee's $20,000 note would be
approximately $8,000, 164 and the employee would be entitled to a $4,000
interest deduction in year five, and an additional $4,000 interest deduction
in year ten.'" This would be true whether the employee was a cash or ac-
"I See text and note 177 supra.
1 tl 3 See note 181 supra. The regulations under 1.R.C. § 483 contain an example indicat-
ing that the I.R.S. would, in this hypothetical, apply § 483 to the two $10,000 payments made
by the employee to the employer. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(6), Ex. 6 (1966). The regulation
. example actually deals with the attempt of an employer to circumvent § 483 by granting an
interest-free loan to his employee at the same time as he is selling property to hint. The
example is as f011ows:
On December 31, 1963 M Corporation sells 500 shares of stock to A, one of its
employees, for a lump-sum payment of $10,000. At the same time, A borrows
$10,000 from M Corporation and gives M a non-interest bearing promissory note
which provides that A is to pay M $2,000 at the end of each of the next 5 years.
Section 483 applies to any payments made by A under the promissory note in the
same manner as if such payments were being made under a deferred-payment
contract for the sale or exchange of the stock.
It is not clear in the regulation example whether the lump sum payment of $10,000 re-
presents the fair market value of the stock, indicating a bargain sale situation, or whether it
represents the sum of the fair market value and a reasonable, but unstated, interest amount.
If the latter was intended, the example is within the usual operation of § 483. See text at notes
172-79 supra. Nonetheless, the section's failure to exclude bargain sales should suffice to bring
them within its operation. If the $10,000 payment in the example represents merely the fair
market value, however, then the example explicitly confirms this reading of § 483 as applying
to bargain sales of property accomplished through interest-free loans.
154 I.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(a)(1) (1966).
"5 I.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1(0(1) (1966); 1.483-2(a)(ii) (1966).
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crual basis taxpayer, since section 483 specifically requires that all taxpayers
ratably allocate the imputed interest over all definite principal payments.'"
The question of the employee's realization of compensation seems
clearly to require the answer that the employee realizes $8,000 ordinary
compensation in year one. That $8,000 represents the difference between
the $20,000 fair market value of the stock he received and the $12,000
present value of the notes transferred.' 87 This result, in fact, is required by
section 83, which provides that where property is transferred in connection
with services, the difference between the property's fair market value and
the price paid for the property is additional compensation to the person
who performed the services. This result is also consistent with that reached
for gift tax purposes by the Tax Court in Gertrude Blackburn,'" and for
charitable deduction purposes by the Seventh Circuit in Mason v. United
States,'" both previously discussed.'" The employee's basis in the stock
would be $20,000, $8,000 representing the $8,000 compensation he took
into income,"' and an additional $12,000 representing the value of the
note with which he paid for the property.
In summary, then, the tax consequences for the employee in the
above hypothetical should be:
(a) $8,000 ordinary compensation income in year one;
(b) a $4,000 interest deduction in years five and ten; and
(c) a $20,000 basis in the stock received.
As has been demonstrated, these rational results are provided by current
law through the combined operations of section 483, which grants the
employee a deduction for constructive interest, and section 83, which re-
quires that he recognize compensation income.
b. Employer's Tax Consequences
The tax consequences for the employer in the above hypothetical be-
come evident once the employee's tax results have been determined. Under
section 483, the employer will recognize total constructive interest income
of $8,000, reportable in the same years in which the employee is allowed
the interest deduction, i.e., $4,000 in year five and $4,000 in year ten.'"
'" Treas. Reg. §1 1.483-I(a)(1) (1966); 1.483-2(a)(ii) (1966).
" 7 If property is transferred by an employer to an employee for an amount less than its
fair market value, the difference between the amount paid for the property and the amount
of its fair market value is taxable compensation to the employee. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2)(1)
(1957). The same rule applies to a bargain purchase by a shareholder from a corporation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j) (1955).
'" 20 T.C. 204 (1953). See text at notes 153-56 supra for a description of the Blackburn
case. As noted above, see text at notes 148-58 supra, in the recent case of Lester Crown, 67
T.C. 1060 (1977), the majority of the tax court, in holding that a donative interest-free loan
did not result in a taxable gift, entirely ignored its previous contrary decision in Blackburn. Id.
at 1068.69 (dissenting opinion).
"° 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of this case see text at notes 143-47
supra.
'" See text at notes 143-47 and 153-56 supra.
'°' See cases cited in note 55 supra.
1 °'I.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1(a)(1) (1966); 1.483-2(a)(1)(ii) (1966).
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This will be true whether the employer is a cash or accrual basis tax-
payer.'" Then, under section 162(a)(1), the employer will deduct $8,000 in
year one as a business expense for compensation paid. This deduction cor-
responds to the employee's recognizing compensation income of $8,000 in
that same year. In addition, the employer will realize a total capital gain of
$15,000 on the sale of the stock. This result obtains because the employer's
basis in the stock was $5,000 and the amount realized is the promissory
note with a present value of $12,000 plus the $8,000 of services received.'"
The difference between the amount realized, $20,000, and the basis,
$5,000, constitutes the employer's capital gain. 195 Again, section 483, in
combination with other principles of tax law, has produced the logical re-
sult.
2. Sale Of Property By Corporation .To Shareholder In Exchange For
Note Bearing No Interest
a. Shareholder's Tax Consequences
Using the same analysis as for the employee, the shareholder who
receives stock with a value of $20,000 in exchange for his non-interest
bearing obligation to pay the corporation $10,000 at the end of year five
and $10,000 at the end of year ten will have, under section 483, a $4,000
interest deduction in years five and ten.'" In addition, the shareholder
should recognize $8,000 of dividend income in year one. The $8,000 of
dividend income corresponds to the compensation income of the employee
in the preceding example. Moreover, the shareholder will obtain a $20,000
basis in the stock received. $12,000 of this basis represents the cost of the
stock to the shareholder, i.e., the present value of the note transferred in
exchange for the stock."' The remaining $8,000 of the basis is attributable
to the dividend amount which the shareholder has taken into income.'""
b. Corporation's Tax Consequences
In the situation of the transfer of $20,000 worth of stock by a corpo-
ration to a shareholder in exchange for the latter's non-interest bearing
notes for payment of $10,000 in year five and $10,000 in year ten, the cor-
porate transferor will realize $4,000 interest income in years five and ten
under section 483. 199 In addition, the corporation will be considered to
have paid a non-deductible $8,000 dividend in year one. This, again,
represents the difference between the value of the property transferred
155
	 Reg. § 1.483-2(a)(1)(h) (1966).
194 The amount realized under I.R.C. § 1001 clearly includes the $8,000 of services
rendered. See cases cited in note 119 supra.
It may be possible for an employer to defer part of the capital gain under the in-
stallment sale method, if the requirements of section 453(b) are met. To qualify for install-
ment sale treatment, payments in the year of the sale must be less than 30% of the total con-
tract price. Since the $8,000 worth of services received in year one of the example constitutes
40% of the $20,000 price, this particular sale would not qualify for such treatment.
196 1.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1(a)(I) (1966); 1.483-2(a)(1)(ii) (1966).
" 7 See I.R.C. § 1012.
199 The $8,000 becomes part of the shareholder's basis under I.R.C. § 301(d).
199 I.R.C. § 483(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1(a)(I) (1966); I.483-2(a)(1)(ii) (1966),
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and the present value of the notes given in exchange therefor. Also, the
corporation will recognize a $7,000 capital gain on the transfer of the stock
in the sale portion of this part-sale, part-dividend transaction. This $7,000
represents the difference between the $12,000 value of the promissory note
received from the shareholder and the stock's $5,000 basis. The additional
$8,000 of gain will go unrecognized. This is so because section 311(a)(2)
provides that a corporation will recognize no gain or loss on the
distribution of property with respect to its stock. 20 ° Thus, although the
appreciation in the stock is realized on the sale thereof, it is not realized on
the dividend distribution.
Accordingly, when property is sold to a shareholder or employee in
exchange for his non-interest bearing note in a face amount equal to the
fair market value of the property transferred, the transaction is properly
seen as containing two distinct elements. First, it is a bargain sale of
property with income and deduction consequences for the transferor and
transferee, just as in any bargain sale. Second, it is a deferred payment sale
of property to which section 483 applies, resulting in interest income to the
transferor corporation or employer, and interest deductions to the
transferee employee or shareholder. Thus, in these combined bargain sale
and interest-free loan situations, rational tax consequences can be reached
under current law. Adoption of the recommended two-payment analysis of
interest-free loans thus would represent simply the extension of logical tax
treatment to the entire field of interest-free loans between employers and
employees and between corporations and shareholders.
V. THE SECTION 482 REGULATIONS: THEIR EFFECT ON INTEREST-FREE
LOANS FROM CORPORATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL STOCKHOLDERS
Under section 482 of the Code, in order to prevent tax evasion or
properly to reflect income, the Commissioner may allocate items of "in-
come, deductions, credits, or allowances" between "two or more organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated ...) owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests."'" In 1968 new reg-
ulations were adopted under that section, dealing, inter alia, with the im-
putation of interest on non-interest bearing or low interest loans between
controlled business enterprises. A typical fact pattern with which these reg-
ulations deal is the following:
Subsidiary corporation makes a $100,000 interest-free loan to its
100% owner parent. The parent uses the loan proceeds as work-
ing capital, and it is therefore impossible to show whether or not
the proceeds of the loan, in fact, generated income outside the
controlled group.
2" E.R.C. § 311(a)(2) provides generally that "no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
corporation on the distribution, with respect to its stock, of—... (2) property."
For discussions of the enactment and purposes of § 482, see J.NnynE, supra note
27, § 218, at 633, B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 1 15.06; Lewis, Allocations (Sec.
482)–General Coverage, 230-2d TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO (1976); Schmid, Allocations (Sec.
482)–Specific Transactions, 230-2d TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO (1976).
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The regulations under section 482 make it clear that, on the facts of
the hypothetical, the Commissioner is empowered to allocate seven percent
annual interest income to the subsidiary-lender. 202 To take this action, the
Commissioner is not required to show that the loan resulted in the realiza-
tion of income to the controlled group from dealings outside the group. 2 °3
The parent-borrower, however, must be provided a correlative seven per-
cent interest deduction in the same taxable year. 204 "[P]resumably, the [col-
lateral] effect of such adjustments would be to create constructive dividend
income to the parent." 205 If so, it appears that, where section 482 by its
terms applies to an interest-free loan, the logical two-payment transaction
tax consequences are reached.
The following discussion will examine first, the significance which the
reasoning underlying the section 482 regulations and cases holds for the
appropriate treatment of interest-free loans which fall outside the scope of
the section; and second, the possible situations in which section 482 will
apply to interest-free loans from a corporation to an individual sharehold-
er.
A. The Relationship of the Creation of Income Issue Under Section 482 to
Interest-Free Loans Outside the Scope of Section 482
All the courts that have considered the issue have upheld the validity
of the section 482 regulations against the attack that they authorize the
202 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(d)(4) (1962); 1.482-2(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) (1968). Schmid, supra
note 201, at A-4 - A-9. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4) (1968) states that:
If the members of a group of controlled taxpayers engage in transactions with
one another, the district director may distribute, apportion, or allocate income,
deductions, credits, or allowances to reflect the true taxable income of the in-
dividual members notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate income anti-
cipated from a series of transactions may not be realized or is realized during a
later period. For example, .. , if one member of a group lends money to a sec-
ond member of the group in a taxable year, the district director may make an
appropriate allocation to reflect an arm's length charge for interest during such
taxable year even if the second member does not realize income during such
year The provisions of this subparagraph apply even if the gross income con-
templated from a serious of transactions is never, in fact, realized by the other
members.
2 " See Treas. Regs. I.482-1(d)(4) (1968) and 1.482-2(a) (1968).
2" See Treas. Reg,	 1.482-1(d)(2) (1962); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, ¶
15.06 at 15-30; Lewis, supra note 201, at A-12 - A-14. The Commissioner may take this action
without the necessity of showing that the loan resulted in the realization of income to the con-
trolled group stemming from dealings outside the group. Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(d)(4) (1962).
Numerous recent cases under section 482 have upheld the validity of the section 482
regulations against the attack that they authorise the Commissioner to create income where
none otherwise existed, rather than simply permitting the Commissioner to allocate existing
income. E.g., Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975);
Kerry Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108, 109-10 (9th Cir. 1974); Liberty Loan
Corp. v. United States, 498 F.2d 225, 228-32 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974);
Commissioner v. B. Forman & Co., 453 F.2c1 1144, 1155-56 (2c1 Cir.) cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934
(1972); Collins Elec. Co., 67 T.C. 911, 921 (1977). For extensive commentary on section 482
and this line of cases, see Black, What is Income? A View From Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 42 TENN. L. REV. 673 (1975); Hamlin, Section 482 in the 1970's: Commissioner's Authority to
Allocate—When, How and to Whom, 1973 So. CAI.. Tax iNST 701, 706-22; Comment, Creation of
Income Versus Allocation of Income: The Section 482 Controversy, 51 TEN. L. REV. 920 (1973);
Nauheim, B. Forman C.6 Co.—A Crucial Test of the Future of Section 482, 26 TAX Law. 107 (1972).
2" B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, at 11 15.06, at 15-34.
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Commissioner to create income where none otherwise exists.'" That is, the
courts agree that the Commissioner, pursuant to his authority under sec-
tion 482, may "impute" interest income to a business enterprise that makes
an interest-free loan to another, provided that the two businesses are com-
monly controlled. The Commissioner may impute such income even if the
loan does not result in the realization of income to the controlled group by
dealings outside the group.'" In so holding, however, all of these courts
have derived the Commissioner's authority from section 482, 208 apparently
assuming without analysis—as did the cases previously discussed in Part
1209
—that the Commissioner lacks general authority under section 61 to
impute interest income to a corporation that transfers money interest-free
to its shareholders.'" As a result, it might appear that in situations not
covered by section 482, the cases forbidding the imputation of interest still
govern. If so, under present law, section 61 alone does not give the Com-
missioner authority to draft regulations to produce results that reflect the
economic reality of interest-free loans between corporations and sharehold-
ers.
This restrictive view of the Commissioner's authority, however, is sub-
ject to considerable doubt. As Professor Chommie points out in his treatise:
The predecessor of section 482 was enacted in 1924 ... when
the assignment of income doctrine and other tax avoidance doc-
trines were yet to be developed by the courts. Thus, from a pre-
sent day perspective it may well appear that section 482 adds but
little to the general enforcement power of the Revenue Service
to insist upon realities governing business transactions for tax
purposes, especially transactions between related persons and en-
tities.'"
Indeed, in enforcing section 482, the courts have recognized that the im-
putation of interest income to interest-free loans accords with economic re-
ality . 212
 Thus, apart from the authority granted by section 482, the Com-
missioner should have the power to impute interest payments so as to re-
1" E.g., Kahler Corp. v, Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1, 4-5 (8th Cir. 1973); Commissioner
v. B. Forman & Co., 453 F.2d 1144, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1974);
Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 15 (Nov. 9, 1977).
2" See cases cited in note 206 supra.
"' See, e.g., Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1, 4-5 (8th Cir. 1973); Commis-
sioner v. B. Forman & Co., 453 F.2d 1144, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934
(1972); Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 15 (Nov. 9, 1977).
2" Brandtjen & Kluge, 34 T.C. 416 (1960); Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. 304
(1952); and Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940).
2" In Latham Park Manor, 69 T.C. No. 15, for instance, the Tax Court distinguished
prior cases forbidding the imputation of interest income where no interest was actually paid or
received on the ground that those cases either were decided prior to the issuance of the perti-
nent § 482 regulations, Treas. Regs. 1.482-1(d)(4) (1968) and I.482-2(a) (1968), or did not
focus on those regulations. The Second Circuit in B. Farman noted that to the extent the prior
cases could be read as forbidding the allocation of interest income under 1.R.C. § 482, they
conflicted with the purpose of that section. 453 F.2d at 1155-56.
2"1 CHOMM1E, Mira note 27, § 218, at 633. See B. BITTKER .1.EUSTICE,Isupra note 3, 1
15.07-15.08, at 15-36 - 15-49.
2I2 E.g., Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1, 4-5 (8th Cir. 1973); Commissioner
v. B. Forman & Co., 453 F.2d 1144, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1974);
Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. No. 15 (Nov. 9, 1977).
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Elect economic realities, under the assignment of income and other tax
avoidance doctrines, with a statutory basis in the general authority of sec-
tion 61.
B. The Possible Application of Section 482 to Certain Interest-Free
Loans from a Corporation to an Individual Stockholder
It is clear that section 482 is not, by its terms, generally applicable to
dealings between a corporation and an individual shareholder, even if that
individual shareholder controls the corporation. The entities subject to sec-
tion 482 are "organizations, trades, or businesses," not individuals. 213
Nevertheless, section 482 may be applicable where there are non-arm's
length dealings between a corporation and an individual shareholder if, in
those dealings, the individual shareholder is acting in his capacity as pro-
prietor of a separate business. In that case the controlling individual
shareholder could be considered an organization or business within the
meaning of section 482, and the rules of that section would be applied. 214
Consider for example, the situation of Doctor A, who practices
medicine in non-corporate form and is also the 100% shareholder of Cor-
poration R, which is engaged in the purchase and sale of real estate. If
Corporation R transfers an interest-free loan to Doctor A, which the doctor
uses for personal purposes, section 482 is inapplicable and general tax
principles will be applied. It was demonstrated in Part I that, under the
Tax Court's view, this will result in no income and no deduction for Doctor
A215 and no interest income for the corporate lender. 2 " Tax logic, on the
other hand, would demand that the corporation realize interest income
equal to a fair interest rate on the loan, and that the doctor recognize div-
idend income in the same amount, with an offsetting deduction for the in-
terest "paid." 217
 This logical result apparently would be reached under sec-
tion 482 if the facts of the hypothetical were changed such that the doctor
took the loan proceeds and applied them to purchase new equipment for
his medical practice.'" In that case the "two business" requirements of sec-
tion 482 would be met. While there is no law on the subject of tracing loan
proceeds for the purpose of invoking the "two business" requirement of
section 482, effectuation of the purposes of section 482 would seem to de-
mand such tracing. Otherwise the attempt clearly to reflect income will be
frustrated whenever the recipient of the income has both a business and an
individual identity.
If, in the above example, the Service traced the use of the interest-
free loan to the doctor's medical practice, the Commissioner would have
"3 See Treas. Reg.	 1.482-1(a) (1962). But if a court finds that an individual is actually
operating an independent business, I.R.C. 482 may be applied. See, e.g., Burge v. Commis-
sioner, 405 F.2d 673, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1968), ceti. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969); Revel D. Cooper,
64 T.C. 576, 580 (1975); Richard Rubin, 56 T.C. 1155, 1157-60 (1971), affd per curiam, 460
F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); Lewis, supra note 201, at A-3 - A-6.
"4 See cases cited in note 213 supra,
"8 See notes 11-12 supra.
2 " J..Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961). See text at notes 93-103 supra.
2" See Part I supra. Dividend income results, of course, only when the corporation has
adequate earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1); 316(a).
"8 See text at note 213 supra.
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authority to reallocate income under section 482. The Commissioner's pri-
mary adjustment would be to provide the corporate transferor with interest
income equal to a fair interest rate on the loan 2 "—currently defined as
seven percent in the case of a transferor not in the business of making such
loans. 220 The section 482 regulations"' then would provide for a correla-
tive adjustment for the recipient of the loan, 222 which in this case would
mean giving the doctor a deduction for interest paid. Moreover, while
there are no cases or rulings on the subject, it seems clear that the doctor
also should be charged with dividend income in the amount of the eco-
nomic value of the interest-free loan. 223
The factual setting of the recent gift tax case of Lester Crown v. Com-
missioner224 would seem perfectly suited for the invocation of the tracing
theory suggested. In that case, a partnership made interest-free loans to
trusts for the benefit of the relatives of the donor-partners. The trusts used
the loans to acquire interests in another partnership. The Tax Court held
that the economic benefit of the interest-free use of money did not consti-
tute a taxable gift. 225
 Although the Tax Court held in Crown that there was
no taxable gift, it might be possible for the Internal Revenue Service to
argue that interest income should be imputed to the partners of the
donor-partnership with an interest deduction given to the donee-trusts. It
would appear that by tracing the loans through the trusts to the acquired
partnership the two-business requirement of section 482 would be met,
since the section 482 regulations include a trust in their definition of the
term "organization. , n 226 If the two businesses or organizations are deter-
215 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(d)(4) (1962); 1.482-2(a) (1968).
220 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) (1968).
221
 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2) (1962).
222 The correlative adjustment procedure of Treas. Reg. § 1,482-1(d)(2) (1962) is a
principal feature of the regulations.
By requiring an appropriate correlative adjustment to be made on behalf of
other members of the group who are affected by the primary adjustment under
§ 482, the regulations emphasize the fact that § 482 is an allocation section,
rather than a disallowance provision. For example, if income is reallocated from
Subsidiary X to Subsidiary Y under § 482, the income of X must be decreased to
take account of the fact that the income has been attributed to Y.
B. BITTKER & J. E.USTICE, supra note 3, 1 15.06 at 15-30.
223 Cf. B. BEETKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 3, 1 15.06 at 15-33 - 15-34. The authors
there refer to the collateral effects of § 482 adjustments and note that "Moremost among
these indirect effects is the possibility of constructive dividend treatment where income or de-
ductions are reallocated between ... parent-subsidiary corporations." Id. They note further
that
[r]eallocation of the parent's income to its controlled subsidiary is not covered by
any specific cases or rulings, but presumably the effect of such adjustments
would be to create constructive dividend income to the parent. Thus, while the
parent would be entitled to a correlative adjustment, reducing its income to the
extent that it was reallocated to its subsidiary under § 482, there would be an in-
crease in its income due to the constructive dividend treatment ... resulting in a
net reduction of the parent's income.
Id. at 15-34. The net reduction in the parent's income results because the full constructive div-
idend is unlikely to be taken into the parent's income as a result of the dividends received de-
duction of § 293.
221 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
225 1d. at 1064-65.
"Li Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (1962).
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mined to be controlled by the same interests, section 482 would then apply,
permitting reallocation of income.
As has been demonstrated, section 482 itself provides logical tax
treatment for at least some non-arm's length, interest-free loans between
corporations and shareholders. No reason appears for limiting the tax re-
flection of economic reality to those cases that can be brought within the
purview of section 482, since, as explained above, section 61 and the as-
signment of income cases provide ample support for a logical approach to
all interest-free loans between corporations and shareholders and between
employers and employees.
CONCLUSION
Interest-free loans between Corporations and shareholders, and be-
tween employers and employees, are economically equivalent to a two-
payment transaction involving a loan on which interest is charged, accom-
panied by an increase in dividend, or in compensation, in the amount of
the interest payment. The tax consequences under present law, however,
are quite different. In the two-payment transaction, the recipient
shareholder-employee would have dividend or compensation income and a
deduction for the constructive interest payment. The lender would rec-
ognize constructive interest income. A deduction for reasonable compensa-
tion would be available to the employer-lender. The interest-free loan, by
contrast, gives rise to no imputed interest income to the transferor under
current law. An employer-lender receives no compensation deduction for
the economic benefit transferred to the employee. Nor is the recipient of
an interest-free loan either required to recognize as income the economic
value of the loan or permitted an imputed interest deduction. Were the tax
treatment of the interest-free loan made to correspond to that of the two-
payment transaction, often the income and deduction would offset one
another, producing, the same tax liability as under a no-income, no-
deduction approach, However, in many cases the tax liability indeed would
be different, and frequently important tax repercussions would be felt even
though the income is offset by an equivalent deduction.
Where the effects could be different, recognition of economic reality
demands that the interest-free loan be analyzed, for tax purposes, as if it
were a two-payment transaction. Even where the results do not differ be-
tween the two-payment transaction analysis and the no-income, no-
deduction approach, the two-payment analysis is preferable because it ac-
cords with tax logic and avoids the obfuscation of tax principles inherent in
the no-income, no-deduction approach. It is to be hoped that the courts
will reconsider their acceptance of the no-income, no-deduction approach
and instead adopt the two-payment analysis. Only then will the actual eco-
nomics of interest-free loans between corporations and shareholders and
between employers and employees be reflected in their tax treatment.
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